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1 . Did defendant's paranoia render him incompetent to 
stand t r i a l ? 
2 . Did the t r i a l court err in al lowing defendant t o 
make the t a c t i c a l dec i s ion not t o pursue a l e s s e r included 
offense and in ruling that he could not present evidence of an 
insani ty defense when he refused to cooperate with court-
appointed examiners? 
3 . Is S 77-14-4(2) barring presentat ion of an insani ty 
defense where a defendant refuses to cooperate with court-
appointed examiners an unconst i tut ional v i o l a t i o n of due process 
and equal protect ion? 
4 . Did the t r i a l court properly order court-appointed 
counsel to continue representing defendant when defendant refused 
t o a f f irmat ive ly waive h i s r ight to counsel? 
5. Did the t r i a l court ac t within i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
denying defendant's motion for a change of venue that was 
unsupported by evidence of media prejudice? 
6. Did defendant have a f a i r and impartial jury on the 
i s sue of the jurors ' f e e l i n g s about the death penalty? 
1. Did defendant have a f a i r and impartial jury on the 
i s sue of jurors ' preconceived opinions about h is g u i l t ? 
8. Was there s u f f i c i e n t vo ir d ire of the jury panel 
about the ir knowledge of defendant's brother's convict ion of the 
same crimes? 
9. Is death q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a jury in a capital case 
cons t i tu t iona l? 
10. Did the prosecutor commit prejudic ia l error by 
referring t o matters the jury was not e n t i t l e d to consider in 
rendering t h e i r verdic t? 
11 . Were the color photograph of Brenda Lafferty and 
the black and white photograph of Erica Lafferty admitted at 
g u i l t phase so prejudic ia l that the prejudic ia l e f f ec t outweighed 
the probative value? 
12 . Was the videotape recording of the crime scene 
that was exhibi ted during the penalty phase so prejudic ia l that 
the prejudic ia l e f f ec t outweighed the probative value? 
13. Does Utah's bifurcated capi ta l sentencing scheme 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly s h i f t the burden of persuasion t o the 
defendant at penalty phase? 
14. Could the jury have properly been allowed t o 
consider Dan Laf fer ty 1 s l i f e sentence in determining the 
appropriateness of the death sentence for defendant? 
15. Was i t error t o allow the State to present 
evidence of defendant's v i o l e n t character as exhibi ted against 
ce l lmates and j a i l e r s in the Utah County J a i l to demonstrate h i s 
future propensity to commit crimes on the issue of the 
appropriateness of the death penalty? 
16 . Did the evidence demonstrate that reasonable minds 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating fac tors 
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outweighed the mitigating factors and that the death penalty was 
appropriate? 
17. Did hearsay evidence relating defendant's violent 
character while inside the Utah County Jail admitted at the 
penalty phase prejudice defendant to a degree warranting reversal 
of his death sentences? 
18. May the jury in a capital case during 
deliberations on the appropriate penalty consider the evidence 
adduced at trial? 
19. Was defendant entitled to an arrest of judgment 
because the evidence showed he was mentally ill but did not 
render him incompetent to stand trial or unable to form the 
mental states required for commission of his crimes? 
20. Were there three separate conspiracies making it 
possible to convict defendant of two conspiracies to commit 
murder without illegally convicting him of both an inchoate crime 
and a completed offense? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 20740 
- v - : 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, : P r i o r i t y No. 2 
Defendant -Appel lant . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two f i r s t -degree 
murders of Brenda and Erica Lafferty committed on July 24, 1984, 
in v io la t ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1985), both 
capi ta l homicides. Defendant was also charged with aggravated 
burglary of the Lafferty home and aggravated burglary of the 
Chloe Low home on the same date, in v io la t ion of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-203 (1978) and two counts of conspiracy to commit f i r s t -
degree murder of Chloe Low and Richard Stowe, f i r s t -degree 
fe lonies , in v io la t ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of a l l counts and the death 
penalty was imposed, in a jury t r i a l held April 25 through May 7, 
1985, in the Fourth Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J . Robert Bullock, 
presiding. Judge Bullock sentenced defendant on May 7, 1985 to 
be put to death for both f i r s t -degree murders and also to serve 
prison terms of five years to l i f e for each aggravated burglary 
and of one to f i f teen years for conspiracy to commit murder. All 
sentences t o run consecutively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When Allen Lafferty returned home from work on July 24 , 
19B4 he thought the house seemed strange (R. 2156). I t was 8:00 
p.m., h i s w i f e ' s car was in the driveway but the door was locked 
and the t e l e v i s i o n was on (R. 2155-56). He saw blood on the wall 
by the door and supposed Brenda, h i s w i f e , might have gone to the 
hospi ta l (R. 2156). Then he found her ly ing on the kitchen 
f l o o r , long dead (r. 2156) . Allen t r i e d the nearby telephone but 
i t was torn from the wal l (R. 2156). He t r i e d to d i a l 911 on the 
bedroom phone but i t would not work (R. 2156) . F ina l ly , he 
checked baby Er ica ' s room thinking she was probably as l eep , but 
he found her dead, too (R. 2156) . From a neighbor fs house, Allen 
c a l l e d the p o l i c e . 
American Fork Pol ice Detect ive Gary Caldwell 
inves t iga ted that night (R. 1828). When he entered the door of 
the Laf fer ty 1 s duplex he saw a f ingernai l laying on the f loor 
j u s t ins ide the door and blood a l l over the wal l (R. 1831). 
He could see a woman's head, ly ing in a pool of blood in the 
kitchen (R. 1831). Brenda Lafferty was dead (R. 1832). There 
was a vacuum cleaner cord wrapped two or three times around her 
neck (R. 1832, 1841). Her throat had been cut from ear t o ear 
(See Ex. 1 8 ) . She l a i d in a four-foot by four-foot pool of blood 
(R. 1832) . The drapes were bloody and had been ripped down 
(R. 1832) . They looked as though someone had wiped off something 
bloody on them (R. 1847). A p i l low, lay ing on the f loor next to 
her f e e t was covered with blood (R. 1832, 1845) . 
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Before she died, Brenda was beaten severely with a 
blunt instrument (R. 1979). There were multiple bruises on her 
face and body (R. 1977-78). She was also strangled with a smooth 
ligature that caused the small capillaries over her eyes and neck 
to break and hemorrhage (R. 1974-75). But none of these injuries 
was fatal (R. 1976). When Brenda1s throat was cut, completely 
transecting her esophagus and partially severing both carotid 
arteries, the main blood supply to the head and neck, her body 
was still alive (R. 1972-73, 1975). The amount of blood on the 
floor around her body indicated that her heart was still pumping 
when her neck was cut (R. 1976) . 
Erica Lafferty, about a year old, was slumped against 
the wall of her crib (R. 1841-42). There was "blood all over 
everywhere." (R. 1842). Her neck had been cut so deeply, her 
head was nearly severed from her body (R. 1842, Ex. 20). 
Erica1s body and diaper were covered with blood 
(R. 1984). The gaping, incised wound in her neck extended from 
ear to ear (R. 1987). The skin, muscles, larynx, esophagus, both 
carotid arteries and both jugular veins were severed and a very 
small amount of blood was aspirated into her lungs (R. 1987-88). 
Only her spine had prevented complete decapitation (R. 1986). 
Both Brenda1s and Erica's neck wounds were inflicted by 
a sharp cutting instrument (R. 1873, 1985-86). The margins of 
the wounds were very clean and regular, suggesting that the 
wounds were inflicted in a single motion without sawing action 
(R. 1973-74, 1986). 
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On July 30, 1984, Rick Knapp and Chip Carnes were 
arrested in Cheyenne, Wyoming (R. 2007). They were found with a 
green Chevrolet station wagon, a red cooler and a sawed-off 
shotgun (R. 2007-10, 2014). They described a crime spree that 
began with the deaths of Brenda and Erica Lafferty masterminded 
and executed by defendant, Ronald Lafferty and his brother, Dan. 
Carnes and Knapp were traveling through the Western United 
States during July with defendant and Dan (R. 1704, 1708-09, 1710-11, 
2283-84), in a green Chevrolet station wagon (R. 1705, 2282). 
The Lafferty brothers insisted that they received revelations from God 
and that they were doing the work of the Lord (R. 1703, 1775-80). On 
July 22, 1984, the four men arrived in Provo, Utah where they stayed 
with the Lafferty1s mother (R. 1718, 2285). On the 23rd, they held a 
Bible study session (R. 1720, 2286). Defendant and Dan read from the 
Bible and another book and talked of slashing the throats of Brenda 
and Erica (R. 2289). 
The next morning, Carnes helped Dan saw off the barrel of a 
12-gauge shotgun (R. 1722, 2290). Defendant said this would be "good 
for shooting cops" (R. 1725, 2293). Defendant asked defendant, if 
•their throats have to be cut couldnft we just shoot them?" (R. 2289). 
Defendant assured him that the Lord wanted their throats cut (R. 
2289). The four men got into the Chevy and drove to the mountains to 
do some target shooting (R. 1729, 2295). On the way, they stopped at 
Mark Lafferty1s house to pick up another gun (R. 1727-28, 2151-52, 
2293-94). Mark asked what they were going to hunt and defendant said, 
"Any fucking thing that gets in my way" (R. 1728, 2153, 2294). They 
discovered they did not have the proper ammunition to fit the gun and 
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went back t o Mark's (R. 2295) . Mark said the gun for the ammunition 
they had was at A l l e n ' s house, so they drove there (R. 2295). On the 
way, they picked up t h e i r red cooler that they had l e f t behind at Mrs. 
L a f f e r t y f s house (R. 1730, 2296). 
When they got to A l l e n ' s defendant went t o the door but no 
one answered (R. 1732-34, 2298). The men drove off but Dan said they 
should go back, that he " f e l t l i k e doing i t " (R. 1734, 2298) . They 
returned to A l l e n ' s house and t h i s time Dan went t o the door (R. 1735, 
2298) . When Brenda Lafferty opened the door, Dan asked for the gun 
and asked to come in but Brenda refused 
(R. 1735-36, 2299) . Then Dan jus t forced h i s way inside 
(R. 1736, 2299). Outside, Carnes, Knapp and defendant could hear 
arguing and heard something heavy hit the door, causing the wa l l s of 
the house t o v ibrate (R. 1737, 2299). The neighbors in the adjoining 
apartment a l s o observed the wa l l s v ibrat ing (R. 1882, 31887). Knapp 
to ld defendant he should go ins ide and help because they were going to 
get caught (R. 1738, 2301) . 
Defendant forced h i s way through the door (R. 1739, 2301) . 
Once he was i n s i d e , "all he l l broke loose" (R. 1739, 2301). Carnes 
and Knapp, who claimed they did not know why they were there that day, 
heard v o i c e s and loud noises (R. 1739-40, 2296, 2298, 2301-02). A 
woman begged for forgiveness and said "please don't hurt my baby" (R. 
1739, 2301-02). Defendant c a l l e d her a b i tch (R. 1739, 2301). The 
baby screamed "Mommy, Mommy, Mommy" (R. 1738, 1740, 2301) . Soon 
a f t e r , everything got qu ie t and the Laffertys came out of the back of 
the house (R. 1740, 2302-03) . Carnes and Knapp could see that they 
had washed the ir hands and arms because the ir arms were s t i l l wet (R. 
1741, 2303) . 
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Their clothes were splotched with blood and Carnes was sickened 
by the smell of it (R. 1741, 2303-04). 
The four men then drove to another home (R. 1742, 2304). 
The Laffertys talked about a woman named "Low" and said she was small 
and easy to handle (R. 1742, 2304). They said if her husband was 
there they would not kill her (R. 2305). When they got to the house, 
no one was home, they pulled the alarm wires from the shed wall 
R. 1744, 1851). Carrying the 20-gauge shotgun, they broke in and 
stole some things and tried to get into a gun closet but the door 
jammed (R. 1744-46, 2251, 2306). Scared off by some kids on a motor-
cycle, the men fled (R. 1749, 2307). They headed for Richard Stowe's 
house to kill him but missed the turn and decided God did not want 
them to go there (R. 1752, 2309-11). They filled the car with 
gasoline and drove on to Wendover (R. 1753, 2311). 
On the way to Wendover, defendant said "I killed the 
bitch. I killed the bitch. I canft believe it" (R. 2320). 
He thanked Dan for "doing in" the baby (R. 2320). He* explained 
that he first beat Brenda but she would not "go down"; "I kept 
hitting her and hitting her and hitting her [but] she just 
wouldn't go down"; then he cut the vacuum cleaner cord and used 
it to strangle her until she went limp (R. 2321). And then, when 
Dan said "yes", "he grabbed her chin, held her head back, and cut 
her throat from ear to ear" (R. 2321). 
The four men checked in at a motel in Wendover and went 
to gamble at a casino (R. 1754-55, 2311). No more than five 
hours after the murders they ate hot dogs and drank beer (R. 
1757, 2311). The Laffertys got worried that authorities might be 
looking for the car and they all tried to leave Wendover but they 
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had car trouble just outside town (R. 2312-13) • Later that night, 
Carnes and Knapp, now scared of the brothers, sneaked out of the motel 
while the Laffertys slept and drove to Cheyenne (R. 1761, 2315-16). 
On the way to Cheyenne, they threw out most of the 
Laffertys1 things (R. 1762-65, 2316-18). Police officers in 
Nevada and Idaho later recovered many items including suitcases, 
clothing, briefcases, journals and papers written by the 
Laffertys and a knife (R. 1911, 1960-64). Carnes and Knapp had 
kept the sawed-off shotgun and the cooler with them (R. 1765-66). 
Later, in defendant's home, police found a paper written by 
defendant (R. 1898, 2138-40). The paper purported to be a revelation 
from God directing someone named "Todd" to "remove" Brenda and Erica 
Lafferty, Chloe Low and Richard Stowe (R. 1905-06). Todd was a 
hitchhiker who worked with defendant and his brothers for a time 
(R. 2048-50). Todd disappeared in January or February, 1983 and was 
not with the Laffertys on July 24, 1984 when they murdered Brenda and 
Erica. (R. 2050). 
This revelation was apparently received by defendant 
some months prior to the murders. Sometime during 1983, 
defendant and some of his brothers became involved in a religious 
group known as "The School of the Prophets" (R. 2080, 2083, 
2171). The group discussed religious doctrine and LDS Church 
history and receiving personal re-velation (R. 2084-85). 
Originally, only one man, who led the group, claimed to be 
receiving revelations (R. 2098). Later, defendant claimed to 
have received a revelation that he was very vague about (R. 2099, 
2102, 2178-79) . Usually, the text of any reve lat ion was revealed 
to the group to be discussed and prayed about but defendant did 
not do t h i s (R. 2100-02) . The members of the group had a vague 
understanding that defendant's reve la t ion directed that four 
people be •removed" or k i l l e d (R. 2116) . There was great 
d i s s e n t i o n and a power s truggle within the group that was f i red 
by t h i s reve la t ion (R. 2105-07) . The group would not have 
anything to do with t h i s reve la t ion (R. 2107). 
During t h i s same period, defendant's wife was divorcing 
him (R. 2043, 2157). Defendant thought Brenda Lafferty was 
encouraging h i s wife in the divorce which he vehemently opposed 
(R. 2047, 2074, 2157). He discussed t h i s frequently with his 
brothers , Watson and Al len , Brenda's husband (R. 2045, 2157) . 
Three t o four months prior t o the murders, defendant warned Allen 
that "People aren' t safe anymore trying t o mess up my l i f e . " 
(R. 2184). Defendant to ld Allen about the "revelat ion" but Allen 
thought i t was jus t h i s brother 's way of expressing h i s deep hurt 
over the divorce and h i s f e e l i n g s of b i t t e r n e s s toward Brenda 
(R. 2179) . 
Defendant a l s o thought Chloe Low and Richard Stowe had 
meddled in h i s e f f o r t s t o regain h i s marriage r e l a t i o n s h i p 
(R. 2162, 2164-65) . He discussed t h i s frequently with h i s 
brother (R. 2162). These people were members of the LDS Church 
who had provided a s s i s t a n c e to defendant's ex-wife and s i x 
chi ldren during the time the couple was divorcing (R. 2162-63, 
2165) . 
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The ju ry found defendant g u i l t y of two f i r s t - d e g r e e 
murders , two aggravated b u r g l a r i e s and two c o n s p i r a c i e s t o commit 
murder. After a pena l ty hea r ing , the ju ry determined t h a t death 
was an a p p r o p r i a t e pena l ty for each f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Due t o t h e number of i s sue s involved in t h i s appeal and 
the space r e s t r a i n t s , t h i s summary i s n e c e s s a r i l y b r i e f . 
Defendant was competent t o stand t r i a l because he was 
ab l e t o unders tand the na tu re of the proceedings and t o a s s i s t 
h i s a t t o r n e y in h i s defense i f he so d e s i r e d . His r e fusa l t o 
coopera te with psycholog ica l examiners proper ly bar red him from 
p r e s e n t i n g an i n s a n i t y defense and did not v i o l a t e due process or 
equal p r o t e c t i o n . This requirement i s r a t i o n a l l y based on the 
goal of ach iev ing a f u l l and f a i r hear ing on t h e i s sue of a 
d e f e n d a n t s a b i l i t y t o form the mental s t a t e r equ i r ed for 
commission of the c r imes . 
Defendant was p roper ly allowed t o make the t a c t i c a l 
d e c i s i o n not t o pursue a l e s s e r inc luded offense but t o s tand on 
an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g de fense . This was not improper "hybr id" 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n where defense counsel had been appo in ted . 
F u r t h e r , defense counsel was p roper ly appointed where defendant 
did not waive h i s r i g h t t o counse l . 
Defendant did not demonstra te p re jud ice as a r e s u l t of 
media coverage and was not e n t i t l e d t o a change of venue. 
Moreover, he was t r i e d by a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u ry whose members 
he ld no b i a s toward defendant , the death pena l ty or h i s b r o t h e r 1 s 
prev ious c o n v i c t i o n . The ju ry was a p p r o p r i a t e l y death q u a l i f i e d 
under both s t a t e and f e d e r a l law. 
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Defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
arguments at e i ther phase of the t r i a l . The jurors were not 
asked t o consider matters they were not e n t i t l e d t o consider. 
Nor were the photographs and video tape recording depict ing the 
v ic t ims as they were found at the scene unduly p r e j u d i c i a l . 
Even without the photographic evidence the jury would most l i k e l y 
have convicted defendant and imposed death. 
Utah's cap i ta l sentencing scheme did not s h i f t the 
burden t o defendant t o show that mit igat ing circumstances 
outweighed aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Only the burden of going forward i s s h i f t e d . Moreoverr upon the 
evidence of the appropriateness of the death penalty and of 
aggravating circumstances, including defendant's v i o l e n t 
character and the f a c t s of the case , the jury was j u s t i f i e d in 
f inding that the death penalty was appropriate. The jury could 
not have appropriately considered Dan Laf fer ty 1 s l i f e sentence in 
reaching the dec i s ion where t h i s Court w i l l not even engage in 
such a case-by-case comparison. 
Defendant was not e n t i t l e d t o an arres t of judgment on 
the grounds that he was mentally i l l . That provis ion i s designed 
to guard against aberrant jury verd ic t s not t o protect the 
mentally i l l from the death penalty. Another, more s p e c i f i c , 
s t a t u t e was designed for that purpose. 
F ina l ly , defendant was not convicted of both an 
inchoate and a completed offense on the theory that there was 
only one conspiracy. The evidence revealed three separate 
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conspiracies and defendant was not convicted of conspirary to 
murder Brenda and Erica Lafferty which offenses he did complete. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL. 
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred 
in finding him competent to stand trial. This argument is novel 
in that prior to trial and at all times during trial, defendant 
insisted that he was not mentally ill at all, much less incompe-
tent to proceed. Also, defendant's brief is somewhat misleading 
on the rulings of the court and the findings of the doctors who 
were appointed by the court to examine him for competency. 
In October, 1984, Doctors Washburn and Groesbeck of the 
Utah State Hospital who were appointed to examine defendant's 
competency recommended to the district court that defendant be 
confined for a 60-day evaluation because they found that he was 
mentally ill and incompetent to stand trial (R. 103). At the 
hearing on October 23, 1984, defendant disagreed with the 
conclusions of the doctors (R. 142). He personally cross-
examined Dr. Washburn and called several witnesses, including Dr. 
L. Craig Rosvall, in his own behalf (R. 143). The court 
questioned defendant and allowed him to address his ability to 
represent himself (R. 145). Based upon the evidence presented 
and upon its observations of defendant in open court, the court 
ruled that defendant was competent to proceed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-2 (1982) (R. 145). The court made no finding on 
whether defendant was mentally ill but found that if he was 
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mentally ill, the illness did not render him incompetent to 
proceed (R. 145). Trial was set for the following Monday 
(R. 146). 
One day after the court1 s ru l ing , on October 25, 1984, 
defendant assaul ted Lt. Jerry Scott at the Utah County J a i l 
(R. 1 6 8 ) . As a r e s u l t the State requested another competency 
evaluation (R. 168-70) . The court ordered a further 30-day 
commitment t o the State Hospital (R. 172-73 ) . In a l e t t e r 
received on November 29, 1984, the Administrative Director of the 
Hospital informed the court that the evaluat ion team had found 
defendant competent to proceed (R. 192) . The doctors sa id , 
"We find that Mr. Lafferty i s not mentally i l l . His thought 
processes , mood, a f f e c t , and a b i l i t y to perceive and interpret 
r e a l i t y are each appropriate." (R. 1 9 3 - l e t t e r dated Nov. 27, 
1984) . This l e t t e r was signed by Doctors Austin, Howell, 
Heinbecker and Groesbeck (R. 1 9 3 ) . 
In an in-camera proceeding on November 30, 1984, 
defendant, representing himself , claimed t o be competent as found 
by the doctors and waived h i s right t o a competency hearing 
(R. 242) . The court s ta ted that defendant would not be found 
incompetent without a f u l l hearing and defendant again waived the 
hearing (R. 2 4 3 ) . The court then found defendant competent t o 
proceed (R. 243) . Trial was s e t for January 3 , 1985 (R. 246) . 
On December 29, 1984 defendant attempted su ic ide by 
hanging (R. 261, 263, 2571) . On January 2 , 1985, the S ta te f i l e d 
another p e t i t i o n for determination of defendant's competency to 
proceed because i t was thought that defendant had sustained brain 
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damage from the lack of oxygen while hanging (R. 267) • Based 
upon Utah Code Ann. SS 77-15-3 and 77-15-5 (1982)f the court 
ordered another competency evaluation (R. 269-70). The examiners 
found on January 22, 1985 that defendant was suffering diffuse 
organic brain damage from his apparent suicide attempt and that 
he was, therefore, incompetent to proceed (R. 417). This 
syndrome was characterized by memory loss and other functional 
impairment of the brain (R. 471 at 3). After a hearing on 
January 28f 1985 the court found defendant incompetent to proceed 
and ordered him committed to the State Hospital until competent 
(R. 779-80). The court also stated that there was considerable 
testimony that defendent's condition was not necessarily 
permanent because there had already been a great deal of 
improvement since his commitment in early January (R. 779). 
The evaluation team. Doctors Austin, Howell, Heinbecker 
and Groesbeck, reported on March 19, 1985 that defendant remained 
incompetent to proceed even though "the signs of diffuse organic 
brain syndrome • . • have partially resolved and • . • his 
personality structure and his demeanor have come to approximate 
his condition prior to [the suicide attempt]" (R. 443, letter 
dated March 19, 1985). They based their conclusion on their 
finding that defendant suffered at that time from symptoms of 
paranoia. Using as a standard of review the Supreme Court 
decision in Dusky v. United States, 360 U.S. 402 (1960), the 
doctors opined that, in order to be competent to proceed, 
defendant must be able to rationally assist his attorney and 
rationally perceive the proceedings (R. 803, 812-13, 825, 839, 
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841). They concluded that he was unable to rationally understand 
what was happening to him because he included the court, the 
prosecutor and sometimes the doctors and defense counsel in a 
paranoid delusional system in which he believed he was being 
persecuted (R. 803, 833-23, 839-40). This delusional system was 
manifest in his religious beliefs (R. 801, 825). 
In a lengthy Memorandum Decision, the trial judge 
determined that defendant was competent to proceed (.£££ Appendix 
A; R. 471). The court found that defendant probably suffered 
from a mental disease or defect but that it did not result in his 
incompetency under § 77-15-2 which provides: 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person 
is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering 
from a mental disease or defect resulting 
in either: (1) In his inability to comprehend 
the nature of the proceedings against him or 
the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) In his inability to assist counsel in 
his own defense. 
(R. 471 at 6) . The court found that the defendant had the 
capacity to know and understand the nature of the proceedings and 
the potential penalty, although he might not believe it would 
occur; and that he had the ability to aid his attorney in his 
defense, although he might not choose to do so (R. 471 at 6-7). 
These conclusions were supported by the testimony of 
Doctors Howell, Austin and Groesbeck. All of them testified that 
defendant knew factually; that he was in court and charged with 
several crimes, that he was facing a potential death sentence, 
and that he had been provided with defense counsel who was there 
to help him present his case (R. 793-97, 821-23, 838-42). 
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Dr. Groesbeck thought defendant could relate to his attorney the 
names of witnesses and discuss their testimony but that, because 
of his paranoia, he just might not want to (R. 841-42). 
Dr. Howell and Dr. Austin said defendant could assist his 
attorney if he wanted to (R. 797, 823). The doctors admitted 
that they could not very accurately assess his memory capacity 
because defendant simply refused to talk about the time period of 
the crimes (R. 795, 799, 819-20, 837-38). They also admitted 
that he refused to take tests that would help them to assess his 
mental condition (R. 786-87, 817). They said defendant believed 
that he was not subject to the laws of Utah, and that the doctors 
should "commune with the spirit" to receive the information that 
they sought (R. 788, 801-02, 823, 840). 
Dr. D. Eugene Thorne testified for the State that 
without these tests, the other doctors1 conclusions were 
unreliable (R. 846-47). Dr. Thorne would have liked to have seen 
some test results and stated that an uncooperative patient 
creates highly unreliable data because responses can be faked or 
omitted completely (R. 846-47). Dr. Thorne agreed that defendant 
might have symptoms of paranoia and, in fact, assumed that he was 
paraonoid but opined that paranoia did not preclude defendant 
from having the ability to assist his attorney and understand the 
nature of the proceedings as defined in S 77-15-2 (R. 849-50, 
858-59). 
The competency decision in this case—whether a 
criminal defendant is competent to proceed—is a fact question 
that is left to the judge's discretion and which should not be 
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overturned unless c l ear ly arbitrary, unwarranted or erroneous. 
United Sta tes
 v . v o i c e , 627 P.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir . 1980). The 
judge 1s rul ing in t h i s case was not c l ear ly erroneous and should, 
therefore , be affirmed. Also: 
The fact that the defense had more experts 
t o t e s t i f y than the p l a i n t i f f had, i s not 
of contro l l ing importance. The weight of 
the evidence i s not determined by the number 
of wi tnesses who t e s t i f y for e i ther s ide , 
but by the qua l i ty of the ir testimony. 
United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1972). 
The judge here merely concluded that Dr. Thome's testimony 
outweighed that of Doctors Howell, Austin and Groesbeck. 
The e x p e r t ' s opinions on the i s sue of competency were no bet ter 
than the reasons upon which they were based and were not binding 
upon the court. Feguer v. United StateSr 302 F.2d 214, 236 
(8th Cir. 1962); Dusky v. United S t a t e s , 360 U.S. 402 (1960) . 
The Dusky v. United S t a t e s , 360 U.S. 402 ( i960) , 
standard a r t i c u l a t e d by defendant i s appropriately applied t o 
t h i s case . Defendant, nonethe less , i s not e n t i t l e d t o reversal 
on t h i s i s s u e . The a b i l i t y to r a t i o n a l l y a s s i s t in the defense 
does not mean that he can help with l e g a l quest ions but that he 
can a s s i s t in the phases of the defense that "an accused would 
normally a s s i s t in , such a s , accounts of the f a c t s , i d e n t i t i e s of 
w i t n e s s e s , and s imi lar matters . 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law 
S 96 a t 223. Lyles v. United S t a t e s . 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. 
Cir . 1957) , ££XJt xtefl. 368 U.S. 992, overruled on other grounds 
United S ta tes v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir . 1972) . Thus, 
defendant's b e l i e f in t h i s case that he was not subject to the 
laws of Utah but that h is g u i l t or innocence was a s p i r i t u a l 
matter was not relevant to his ability to assist counsel in the 
way that a defendant normally would. "The presence of some 
degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily 
»ean that he is incompetent to • • . aid and assist in his own 
defense." Wolf v. United States., 430 F.2d 443, 445 (1970); £j*£ 
ALSO McGarrity V. BetO, 335 F. Supp. 1186f 1193 (S.D. Tex. 1971) , 
and cases cited therein. 
The Supreme Court recently reversed a Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision wherein the circuit court had said: 
Fulford had the capability to assist his 
attorney but simply refused to do so. 
But, if this refusal was based on his 
paranoid delusions, it cannot be successfully 
urged that Fulford was actually capable of 
assisting counsel. 
Maggio v. Fulford. 462 U.S. 116 (1983). The high Court noted in 
reversing the Fifth Circuit that the trial judge was in a more 
advantaged position to make a competency determination based not 
only on expert testimony but also on the defendant's demeanor and 
performance in court. JLd. at 117. 
In t h i s case , defendant was cer ta in ly aJbl£ to a s s i s t 
counsel whether he chose to or not. The court made the 
competency dec i s ion in the context of c o n f l i c t i n g expert 
testimony and i t s a b i l i t y to observe defendant throughout the 
proceedings. Although defendant apparently t e s t i f i e d during the 
competency hearing, t h i s testimony i s not part of the record on 
appeal* The court s ta ted , however, that the responses defendant 
gave (he did refuse to answer some quest ions) "were general ly not 
inappropriate under the circumstances." (R. 471 at 5 ) . Based 
upon the testimony and the c o u r t ' s observations of defendant, the 
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c o u r t ' s dec i s ion was wel l within i t s d i s c r e t i o n and was not 
error, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO MAKE TACTICAL DECISIONS 
ABOUT HIS DEFENSE. 
Defendant claims that he was allowed t o act as h i s own 
counsel or co-counsel when the t r i a l court allowed him to 
withdraw his insani ty defense and t o prevent defense counsel from 
presenting evidence on diminished capacity and that t h i s was 
r e v e r s i b l e error. Defendant correc t ly observes, however, that at 
a l l t imes, only defense counsel , Richard B. Johnson, conducted 
argument, examined wi tnes ses and interposed objec t ions on behalf 
of defendant. 
F i r s t , i t must be noted that the t r i a l court did not 
AULQW defendant to withdraw the insani ty defense. What the court 
did was rule that defendant would not be allowed t o present 
evidence of insani ty because he c l e a r l y and unequivocally refused 
to submit to a l l examinations and cooperate with court-appointed 
examiners (R. 900-04) . Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4(2) (1982) 
requires a defendant t o cooperate with court-appointed examiners 
or f o r f e i t any insani ty defense. Thus, the court did not err in 
rul ing that defendant could not produce evidence relevant to an 
insani ty defense. 
Second, the court did allow defendant t o prevent 
defense counsel from presenting certa in psychological evidence at 
t r i a l . Defense counsel c a l l e d Dr. C. Jess Groesbeck t o t e s t i f y 
on defendant's mental s t a t e a t the time of the murders (R. 2427-
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4 9 ) , Before Dr. Groesbeck gave h i s opinion on defendant's s ta te 
of mind on July 24 , 1984 but after he indicated he had an 
opinion, the State objected, the jury was excused, and there was 
d iscuss ion between court and counsel about the a d m i s s i b i l i t y and 
foundational problems in the testimony (R. 2441-55) . Immediately 
thereafter the court took a recess (R. 2455) . When defense 
counsel returned from the reces s , he indicated that defendant was 
object ing to presentat ion of the evidence on h i s mental s ta te 
(R. 2456) . Defendant explained that he f e l t that the evidence, 
used t o reduce the crime t o manslaughter, was an admission of 
g u i l t in exchange for a l e s s e r charge (R. 2456) . He said "I 
don't f e e l comfortable about that at a l l . " (R. 2456) . I n i t i a l l y , 
the court indicated i t would allow Johnson t o put on the 
evidence, noting that i t was an a l t ernat ive theory that defendant 
could raise in addit ion t o claiming innocence. Then the court 
recessed for a one-and-a-half-hour lunch break (R. 2457). 
When court reconvened, there was further d iscuss ion on 
the i s sue (R. 2458-66) . Defendant adamantly opposed, on the 
record, throughout rigorous quest ioning, the use of the 
manslaughter defense. He f e l t strongly that i t was an admission 
of g u i l t with an explanation of the reason for g u i l t and he 
preferred to give the jury only two opt ions , e i ther gu i l t y of 
f i r s t - d e g r e e murder or not g u i l t y (R. 2458, 2459, 2465) . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , defendant on appeal character izes t h i s 
as a diminished capacity defense, however, defense counsel 
represented h i s theory a t t r i a l that "if he . . . part ic ipated in 
anything on July 24th, i t was under circumstances which the actor 
- 1 9 -
reasonably bel ieved provide a moral or l ega l j u s t i f i c a t i o n * " 
(R. 2461)• This was not a diminished capacity defense, per se , 
although defense counse l ' s theory was apparently that defendant's 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , which were connected by the doctors t o h i s 
paranoid delusional system, were the bas i s for defendant's be l i e f 
that he was morally j u s t i f i e d in k i l l i n g Brenda and Erica 
Lafferty . 
Defendant c i t e s People v. Merkouris. 297 P.2d 999 
(Cal. 1956) for the proposit ion that a court should not allow a 
defendant t o withdraw an insani ty defense over h i s counse l ' s 
o b j e c t i o n s . Merkouris i s d i s t ingu i shab le from the instant case 
in that defendant had already been found g u i l t y of f i r s t - d e g r e e 
murder at the time he withdrew the defense. Under the then-
e x i s t i n g Cal i fornia law, the insani ty determination was a 
separate determination made only after g u i l t had already been 
determined. Natural ly, that defendant's dec i s ion at that point 
in time was not only unwise but an ind ica t ion of misperception of 
h i s predicament. 
Such i s not the case here. At the time defendant in 
t h i s case objected to presentat ion of the evidence on h i s mental 
s t a t e , there remained the p o s s i b i l i t y he would be found not 
g u i l t y by the jury. Moreoever, the ex tens ive quest ioning of 
defendant revealed that he had no misperceptions about h i s 
predicament. 
Defendant a l s o c i t e s 21A Am, Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, 
SS 767 and 996 for the premise that a defendant i s not e n t i t l e d 
as a matter of r ight to be heard by himself and a l s o by counsel . 
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That sect ion also s t a t e s , however, tha t i t i s within the c o u r t ' s 
d i sc re t ion whether t o allow defendant to pa r t i c ipa t e in the 
conduct of his defense* I d . ; And JSSL& 21A Am. Jur . 2dr Criminal 
LAV S 997 and cases c i ted there in a t n. 25. Because i t i s a 
d iscre t ionary function on the par t of the t r i a l cour t . Judge 
Bullock did not e r r when he ruled that defense counsel could not 
override defendant 's wishes af ter he determined tha t defendant 
accurately perceived his own predicament even though his judgment 
may have been unwise. JSfi£ Appendix B - Minute Entry. After a l l , 
i t i s the accused, not counsel, who must be 
"informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusat ion," who has the r igh i t to confront 
witnesses , and who must be accorded 
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in h i s favor." The Counsel Clause i t s e l f , 
which permits the accused "to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for h is defense," 
implies a r ight in the defendant to conduct 
his own defense, with assis tance at what, 
after a l l , i s h i s , not counsel ' s t r i a l . 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 944, 949 (1984). 
Defendant also urges tha t the court should have 
ins t ruc ted the jury on the defense of mental i l l n e s s even though 
he did not request an in s t ruc t ion . The issue here i s not, 
however, whether the jury should have been ins t ruc ted absent a 
request for the ins t ruc t ion but, r a the r , whether they should have 
been ins t ruc ted absent evidence upon which to base such an 
in s t ruc t ion . There was no evidence before the jury a t the close 
of the g u i l t phase upon which they could have determined tha t 
defendant was mentally i l l . An ins t ruc t ion on the defense of 
mental i l l n e s s was consequently inappropr ia te . 
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Defendant also insists that the court should have found 
him "guilty and mentally ill" under Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 
(Supp. 1985)• Defendant overlooks that the provisions of that 
statute do not include any language allowing the trial judge to 
make such a finding jBna sponte. There are provisions for a 
defendant to plead "guilty and mentally ill" (77-35-21.5(1)), and 
for the jury to find a defendant "guilty and mentally ill" where 
the defendant pleaded and asserted a defense of "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" (77-35-21.5(2)). Since defendant neither 
pleaded "guilty and mentally ill" nor "not guilty by reason of 
insanity" S 77-35-21.5 does not apply to him. 
POINT III 
SECTION 77-14-4(2) IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4(2) 
denied him due process and equal protection under the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. He asserts without authority and 
with very little analysis that this is so because it allows a 
mentally ill person to waive this defense by not subjecting 
himself to psychological examinations when the reason for such 
refusal is that the defendant's mental illness causes him to be 
paranoid and to claim he is sane. This argument is meritless. 
As this Court stated long ago: 
It certainly would be strange doctrine to 
permit one charged with a public offense to 
put in issue his want of mental capacity to 
commit the offense, and in order to make his 
plea of want to capacity invulnerable prevent 
all inquiry into his mental state or condition. 
State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P. 597, 602 (1922). In that 
same sense, it would be strange doctrine to allow a person to 
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refuse psychological t e s t i n g and refrain from rais ing an insanity 
defense , a l l the while a s ser t ing h i s saneness, and then on appeal 
t o argue he was denied h i s cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s . The bas i s of 
S 77-14-4(2) i s that a person who a s s e r t s that he was insane a t 
the time of h i s offense and, thus, not g u i l t y of the of fense , 
puts the State in a pos i t i on of having to present evidence to the 
contrary. The State cannot present such evidence when the 
defendant refuses to cooperate with court-appointed examiners. 
Certainly , the criminal t r i a l i s s t i l l a 
search for truth subjec t , of course, to 
cons t i tu t iona l guarantees. I t would be a 
strange s i t u a t i o n indeed, i f . . . the 
government i s t o have the burden of proof, 
as i t does with the competence i s sue in 
the case , • • . and ye t i s t o be denied the 
opportunity to have i t s own corresponding and 
ver i fy ing examination, a s tep which perhaps 
i s the most trustworthy means of attempting 
to meet the burden. 
Pope v . United S t a t e s . 372 F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967) . 
This reasoning has been used by many courts to r e j e c t a 
d e f e n d a n t s claim that f a i l u r e to cooperate with court-appointed 
p s y c h i a t r i s t s as a condit ion for ra i s ing the insani ty defense 
v i o l a t e d the Fi f th and Sixth Amendments. £&£ United S ta te s v. 
B y e r s . 740 F.2d 1 1 0 4 , 1 1 1 1 , 1113 (D.C. C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Defendant t r i e s t o d i s t ingu i sh h i s s i t u a t i o n by arguing 
that the doctors he planned to c a l l as defense wi tnesses were 
court-appointed and he had cooperated with them, therefore , he 
had s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied with S 7 7 - 1 4 - 4 ( 2 ) . What defendant 
neg l ec t s t o point out i s that these doctors were appointed t o 
determine defendant's competency to proceed not whether he was 
mentally i l l at the time of the offense (R. 70 , 270, 471 at 7 - 8 ) . 
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The doctors may have gratu i tous ly chosen t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y , but were not ordered to do so . 
Furthermore, defendant did not f u l l y cooperate with the 
evaluat ion team. He refused t o take the t e s t s that would have 
aided d iagnos i s of h i s mental condit ion and refused t o answer 
some of the doctors1 quest ions (R. 786, 817, 838). This does not 
demonstrate a w i l l i n g n e s s t o cooperate. 
Moreover, once the competency evaluat ion team went 
beyond the scope of the c o u r t ' s order for a competency 
evaluat ion, they were no longer act ing as court-appointed 
examiners. At some point , they became defense experts inquiring 
into defendant's a b i l i t y t o form the r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e s for 
the crimes charged. This must be so s ince neither the State nor 
the court requested them to undertake such an evaluat ion. 
It would have been unfair for the t r i a l court to allow these 
experts to t e s t i f y on behalf of defendant without according t o 
the State the opportunity to amass evidence rebutt ing t h e i r 
conclus ions . By^us, 740 F.2d at 1113. 
Returning t o the i ssue of equal protec t ion , defendant 
o f f e r s no a n a l y s i s on t h i s point , neverthe less the State w i l l 
b r i e f l y analyze the i s s u e . 1 Equal protect ion does not require 
that l e g i s l a t i o n operate or apply equally t o a l l c i t i z e n s but 
does require that d iscr iminat ion between c l a s s e s of indiv iduals 
be r a t i o n a l l y based. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 , 670 (Utah 
1 This Court may dec l ine to rule on t h i s i ssue since i t i s 
presented without l ega l a n a l y s i s or author i ty . S tate v. Amicone. 
689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) . 
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1984); Liedtke y, S c h e t t l e r , 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982) . The 
d i s t i n c t i o n between persons who agree to cooperate with mental 
examinations and those who do not i s ra t iona l ly based upon the 
purpose of S 77-14-4 . The purpose of the defense of mental 
i l l n e s s and S 77-14-4 i s t o allow a f u l l and f a i r hearing on the 
i s s u e of the criminal c u l p a b i l i t y of an accused. I t i s rat ional 
for the State to require that persons who throw up obs tac l e s t o 
such a f u l l and f a i r hearing on the i s sue they wish to propound 
be barred from propounding i t . Because there i s a rational bas i s 
for § 77 -14 -4 (2 ) , defendant's argument that i t denies him equal 
protect ion i s unfounded. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ASSERT THE RIGHT TO 
REPRESENT HIMSELF AND, THEREFORE, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT 
APPOINTED COUNSEL CONTINUE REPRESENTING 
HIM. 
Defendant a s s e r t s that he had a cons t i tu t iona l right to 
represent himself under both the Sixth Amendment of the United 
Sta tes Const i tut ion and Art. 12 § 1 of the Utah Const i tut ion . 
He claims that the t r i a l court erred in denying him the right to 
represent himself . 
The State does not dispute that both the s t a t e and 
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s grant defendant the r ight of s e l f -
representat ion. £&£ Faretta v> Californiar 422 U.S. 806 (1975); 
State v, Penderv i l l e , 2 Utah 2d 280, 272 P.2d 195 (1954). 
However, a pro se defendant's r ight of s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s not 
v io la t ed by appointment of stand by counsel . McKaskle v. wigginsP 
U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 944, 954 (1984) . Also, a defendant may 
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waive h i s r ight to s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Id* at 953. Moreover, a 
defendant "has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct h i s own 
defense, provided only that he knowingly and i n t e l l i g e n t l y 
forgoes h i s right to counsel ." I d . at 949, re ly ing on Faretta, 
Several cases have held that a defendant must 
af f irmat ive ly waive h i s right to be represented by counsel on the 
record, that the judge must determine that he did so knowingly 
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y , and that he was competent to do so . E . g - s . 
JEaU£tlar 422 U.S. 806; Westbrook v . Ar izona . 384 U.S. 150 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; 
Johnson V. Z e r b s t , 304 U.S . 4 5 8 , 465 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ; Carnley v . Cochran. 
369 U.S. 506 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; Massey v. Moore. 348 U.S. 1 0 5 , 108 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 
The request t o represent onesel f must be unequivocally made. 
Moreno v. E s t e l l e . 717 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1983); 21A Am. Jur. 2d, 
Criminal Law § 769. A person who i s competent to stand t r i a l i s 
not neces sar i ly competent to waive the r ight to counsel and 
represent himself. Massey v. MooreP 348 U.S. a t 108. 
In t h i s case , although defendant i n i t i a l l y asserted h i s 
r ight to s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n the judge did not err in continuing 
representat ion by court-appointed counsel . When defendant 
appeared in court on competency hearings and other matters prior 
to December 29, 1984 he was allowed t o represent himself with 
stand-by counsel (R. 145-46) . This was appropriate under 
McKaskle v. Wiggins. 104 S.Ct. at 954. After defendant hung 
himself on December 29, stand-by counsel began ac t ing in the 
capacity of s o l e representat ion . This was c e r t a i n l y appropriate 
where defendant's competency was very quest ionable and e s p e c i a l l y 
so a f t er the court found him incompetent t o proceed in January. 
&&& Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750 (2nd Cir . 1975); People v. 
Anderson. 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976). 
Once the court determined defendant was competent t o 
proceed in Apr i l , 19 85, the court gave defendant the opportunity 
t o again a s s e r t h i s r ight of s e l f - representa t ion (R. 569) . 
Defendant, however, s tated "no comment" when asked i f he wanted 
to resume s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Based upon defendant's f a i l u r e to 
af f irmat ive ly waive counsel and allow the court to determine if 
he knowingly and i n t e l l i g e n t l y waived counsel , the court did not 
err in ordering appointed counsel to continue representing 
defendant. Notably, the court went out of i t s way to inform 
defendant that i t would enter ta in defendant's a s ser t i on of h i s 
r ight to s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at any la ter stage of the proceeding 
(R. 570). Nevertheless , defendant never personally asserted the 
r ight . Defense counse l ' s attempts t o reasser t the r ight cannot 
be deemed s u f f i c i e n t where defendant did not afford the court an 
opportunity to ascer ta in i f he wished t o knowingly and 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y waive h i s right to counsel . 
Clearly , defendant's Faretta r ights were not abridged 
by the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order that appointed counsel would continue 
representing defendant. Thus, no error occurred and defendant i s 
not e n t i t l e d t o reversal on t h i s i s s u e . 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE 
OF VENUE. 
Prior to the severance of the co-defendants in t h i s 
case , the defendants f i l e d a £££ ££ motion for a change of venue 
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out of the State of Utah or to Washington County (R. 87) . Along 
with an affidavit (R. 84-86). This motion was not supported by 
legal analysis or authority and was denied (R. 146)• Then, on 
April 23, 1985, two days prior to jury selection for defendant's 
trial, defendant filed a second motion for change of venue 
(R. 517). This motion was supported by an affidavit of counsel 
(R. 509) and a memorandum containing legal analysis and authority 
(R. 512-515)• Judge Bullock denied the motion on April 24 
stating that the affidavit was not sufficient to establish 
prejudice but that defendant was not precluded from filing future 
motions on the issue (R. 569). At the close of jury voir dire, 
defendant renewed his motion but offered nothing more than an 
additional claim that 65% of the jurors had heard of the case 
through the media prior to trial (R. 1663-64). 
Judge Bullock denied this renewed motion based upon his 
observations and questioning of the jurors. Although the 
majority of the jury panel had heard something about the case, 
none of the jurors selected to serve indicated that they had 
formed such strong opinions based upon media reports that they 
would be unable to accord defendant his right to a fair, impar-
tial jury. The court indicated that it felt strongly that jurors 
had been carefully screened on the media issue (R. 1665-66). 
Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred 
in denying these motions because he was denied the right to an 
impartial jury under Art. I $ 12 of the Utah Constitution. As 
support, he claims that Mnlo case in recent Utah history has 
received as much publicity as the instant case." He also alleges 
that 60% of the jury panel knew about the case and had an opinion 
that defendant was guilty. Thus, he argues that the possibility 
of bias was established and the trial court should have granted 
the notion. 
The mere demonstration, however, that some 
dissemination of news thought to be prejudicial to a defendant 
has occurred does not normally entitle him to prevail on a motion 
for change of venue. State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah 1982), 
££i-t. d£ni£d, 459 u.s. 988, state v. Pierre, 572 p.2d 1338, 1349-
50 (Utah 1977), ££i±. denifid, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). As noted in 
KOQd: 
"The mere general showing of publicity 
thought to be adverse to a party is not 
sufficient to require a change of venue 
except in the most extraordinary cases. In 
the usual situation, the movant must at least 
make a showing that the allegedly prejudicial 
material reached the veniremen, so that a 
foundation is laid for the possibility of 
actual bias." Northern California 
Pharmaceutical Association v. United States. 
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1962). 
648 P.2d at 89 (footnote omitted). In Codianna v. Morris. 660 
P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court similarly observed: 
An accused can be denied a fair trial 
where the process of news-gathering is 
allowed such a free rein that it intrudes 
into every aspect of a trial and creates a 
"carnival atmosphere" and where the publicity 
is so weighted against the defendant and so 
extreme in its impact that members of the 
jury are encouraged to form strong 
preconceived views of his guilt. Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Nevertheless, 
•pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse 
publicity—does not inevitably lead to an 
unfair trial." Nebraska Press Association v. 
SluaJLt, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 
2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). 
660 P.2d at 1111. And, the burden is on the defendant to show 
that pretrial news coverage has generated community bias to such 
a degree that the right to a fair and impartial trial has been 
put in jeopardy. Hood, 648 P.2d at 88; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e) 
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29(e) (1982)). 
Defendant argues that the pretrial publicity in his 
case was so massive and prejudicial that it presumptively denied 
him an impartial jury. The law concerning inherently prejudicial 
publicity was largely developed in three major United States 
Supreme Court decisions—gheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 
(1966); Estes v. Texas. 381 U.S. 532 (1965); and Rideau V. 
Louisiansr 373 U.S. 723 (1963). For example, in Sheppard the 
Court stated: 
[WJhere there is a reasonable likelihood that 
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent 
a fair trial, the judge should . . . transfer 
it to another county not so permeated with 
publicity. 
384 U.S. at 363. In PierreF this Court interpreted those cases: 
Concerning Rideau, ILslfLS and Sheppard, the 
Supreme Court in Murphy Vt Floridar 421 U.S. 
794 at 799r 95 S.Ct. 2031, at 2036, 44 
L.Ed.2d 589, said that these cases ". . . 
cannot be made to stand for the proposition 
that juror exposure to information about 
• . . news accounts of the crime with which 
he is charged alone presumptively deprives 
the defendant of due process." Rather these 
cases must be resolved taking the totality of 
circumstances into account. 
572 P.2d at 1349-50. For the same reasons the Court did not find 
the refusal to order a change of venue in Pierre, a highly 
publicized case, to be an abuse of discretion, the Court should 
find no error here. A review of this case leads one to the 
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ident i ca l conclusion that "this i s not one of those exceptional 
cases where pre tr ia l publ i c i ty exacerbated by State complicity 
encouraged the jurors t o form such strong preconceived views of 
the defendant's g u i l t as to be considered inherently prejudic ia l 
against him." £i£jLLfi# 572 P.2d at 1349. £££ ALS£ Codianna, 660 
P.2d a t 1112.2 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , while defendant a l l e g e s that t h i s i s the 
most highly publ ic ized case in recent Utah history and that the 
publ i c i ty was prejudic ia l to him, he does not offer any of the 
media reports for t h i s court 1 s scrut iny . Nor did he provide 
copies of a l l eged ly prejudic ia l materials t o the t r i a l court . 
Given t h i s f a i l u r e to point to s p e c i f i c prejudic ia l mater ia l s , i t 
i s impossible for t h i s Court to determine and was impossible for 
the lower court to decide, whether the material was, in f a c t , 
p r e j u d i c i a l . Because a mere a l l e g a t i o n of pervasive publ i c i ty i s 
2
 Nor does defendant's case represent the "unusual case" l i k e , 
for example, Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir . 1966), and 
Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968) (both c i t ed by t h i s Court in 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89 n. 2 1 ) , where the courts 
demonstrated an increased s e n s i t i v i t y to the e f f e c t of community 
bias pn the f a i r n e s s of a t r i a l . In Pamplin, the defendant was a 
c i v i l r ights leader in a community of l e s s than 30,000 who had 
been charged with aggravated a s s a u l t upon a loca l po l i ce o f f i cer 
committed after he had been arrested in the f i r s t rac ia l 
demonstration ever staged in the community. There were d e f i n i t e 
s igns of an intense community h o s t i l i t y toward the defendant. In 
Ma i ne
 f the defendants were strangers in a small community; the 
v ic t ims of the crime were prominent members of that community; 
one of the v ic t ims was the object of community-wide concern and 
i n t e r e s t ; newspaper pub l i c i ty included references t o a purported 
confess ion by one of the defendants; and f i n a l l y , the two 
opposing counsel were p o l i t i c a l opponents in an upcoming 
e l e c t i o n . Clearly , a cumulation of unusual circumstances 
comparable to those in pamplin and Hain£ did not e x i s t in the 
community where defendant was t r i e d . 
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insufficient to establish juror bias, defendant was not entitled 
to a change of venue. Hood, 648 P.2d at 88-89. 
Moreover, defendant did not show that any specific 
objectionable piece of news coverage reached the jurors* The 
jurors were not asked to reveal what specific articles or news 
reports they had seen nor were most of them any more specific 
than to say they had heard reports in the media; i.e. radio, 
television or newspapers. JS££ e.q- voir dire of: Juror Lowe (R. 
1553), 1558); Juror Hale (R. 1466-68); Juror Curtis (R. 1570); 
Juror Eubank (R. 1339, 1341). Apparently, defendant expects this 
Court to assume that all of the news reports were prejudicial in 
content. Absent a showing in the record to this effect, this 
Court should not make such a leap of faith. £££ State v. 
Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965) (Court will 
not reverse conviction based on matters "dehors" record). 
In short, defendant made no more than a bare allegation 
of prejudice which is inadequate to justify a change of venue. 
Hand, 648 P.2d at 88, £iiina, State v. Gellatlyf 22 Utah 2d 149, 
449 P.2d 993 (1969). Because he has shown no actual prejudice 
that resulted from denial of his motion, his conviction should be 
affirmed. State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah 1984); 
£i£UL£, 572 P.2d at 1350. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED OR 
REFUSED TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN JURORS DUE TO 
THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY. 
Defendant argues that certain prospective jurors who 
were excluded for cause because they expressed a reluctance to 
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follow the law and impose the death penalty, even if appropriate, 
should not have been excluded. On the other hand, he also claims 
that certain prospective jurors who were not excluded should have 
been because they expressed an "eye for an eye" attitude about 
the death penalty. The trial court did not err, however, in its 
decisions regarding these individuals. 
First, defendant claims that prospective jurors Ila 
Lundberg, Judith Ann Johnson and Patrick Shunway should have been 
excused for cause based upon their attitudes toward the death 
penalty. Notably, none of these three persons were challenged 
for cause by defendant. Ms. Johnson was eventually excused after 
defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against her, 
nevertheless, no challenge for cause was made. Ms. Lundberg and 
Mr. Shunway both served as jurors. Defendant should not be heard 
to claim for the first time on appeal that these individuals 
should have been excused for cause when they were not challenged 
for cause. £&£ People v. King, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 463 P.2d 753, 
762 (Cal. 1970); State v. Reidf 698 P.2d 588, 591 (Wash. App. 
1985); State v. Burton, 681 P.2d 646, 655 (Kan. 1984). 
Even if they had been challenged for cause, the judge 
could have appropriately denied the challenges. Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(e)(14) (Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982)) provides 
that, even where actual bias is not shown, a potential juror may 
be excused for cause if "a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party challenging • . . •" That 
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standard has been in te rpre ted t o mean tha t a juror may be excused 
for cause if he or she has formed "strong and deep impressions 
which wi l l close the mind against the testimony tha t may be 
offered in opposit ion to them; which wi l l combat tha t testimony 
and r e s i s t i t s fo rce , • Sta te v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 
1984), c i t i ng Sta te v. Bailey f 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980). 
£&& AlSQ State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983); £JL3±£ 
v. BrooksP 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981). Conversely, t h i s Court 
has acknowledged tha t a potent ia l juror should not be considered 
biased merely because he or she holds " l igh t impressions which 
may f a i r ly be supposed t o y ie ld t o the testimony tha t may be 
offered; which may leave the mind open to a f a i r considerat ion of 
tha t testimony." Sta te v. Bailey* 605 p.2d a t 767, .citing Chief 
J u s t i c e Marshall in Bur r ' s Tr ia l r a t 416. 
Unfortunately, there i s no br ight l i ne between " l igh t 
impressions" tha t wi l l not j u s t i fy dismissal for cause and 
"strong impressions" t h a t w i l l . The instance in which t h i s Court 
has most frequently found strong impressions amounting to implied 
bias i s where potent ia l ju rors admit tha t they may be incl ined t o 
weigh testimony unequally. That was the case in S ta te v. Hewitt. 
689 P.2d a t 26, where the Court reversed the t r i a l court for 
f a i l u r e to dismiss a juror who declared tha t "if the evidence 
came anywhere near being c lose , then 1 would feel l ike the 
de tec t ives deserve the benefi t of the doubt . . • . " In s t a t e v. 
Bai ley . 605 P.2d a t 767-68, the Court held t h a t i t was pre judi -
c i a l error to refuse to excuse a ju ror who had s ta ted tha t he 
"probably would" give the testimony of a police officer greater 
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weight than the testimony of someone not a policeman. Similarly , 
Jenkins v- Parrish. 627 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 1981), a medical 
malpractice case , held that a potent ia l juror should have been 
excused for cause because she admitted that she would give more 
weight to the testimony of a wi tness simply because the witness 
was a doctor. 
Other cases in which t h i s Court has found that the 
t r i a l court erred by refusing to excuse a juror for cause include 
instances where the impressions held by the potent ia l juror 
would, by any standard, be considered strong enough to render the 
juror prejudiced* For instance , in Brooks, a potent ia l juror 
reported that she had been a vict im of an armed robbery and 
a s s a u l t in her home. She s tated that her a s sa i l an t had been 
allowed to go without punishment and that she had "a very strong 
f e e l i n g about t h a t . " As a consequence of those f e e l i n g s , the 
potent ia l juror admitted that she " c o u l d ^ t make an honest 
decis ion" about whether she could give the defendant the benef i t 
of the presumption of innocence but, contrary t o what common 
sense d i c t a t e s , thought she could return a f a i r and impartial 
v e r d i c t . 631 P.2d at 882-83. The Court held that refusing t o 
dismiss that juror for cause was error . I d . at 884. S imi lar ly , 
in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092-93 (Utah 1975) , the 
Court expressed doubt about whether a juror who had admitted 
having "strong f e e l i n g s concerning anyone who would sue to 
recover money for the death of another" could be an impartial 
juror in a wrongful death s u i t . On the other hand, recognizing 
that the t r i a l court has a good deal of d i s c r e t i o n in t h i s area, 
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t h i s Court has in a number of cases upheld the dec i s ion to retain 
a juror challenged for cause. &&& Hewitt. 649 P.2d at 25-26; 
LA£££, 665 P.2d at 1312; State V, MallMPBfir 649 P.2d 56, 60 -61 . 
In Sta te v. Norton, the Court s ta ted : 
On the i ssue of cap i ta l punishment, the 
object of voir d ire i s to obtain a jury that 
can hear the evidence and apply the law 
without l e g a l p a r t i a l i t y for or against 
capi ta l punishment. Approval of or 
opposi t ion to capi ta l punishment in general 
i s not l ega l p a r t i a l i t y for t h i s purpose. As 
the Court observed in Witherspoon v. 
I l l i n o i s . "A man who opposes the death 
penalty, no l e s s than one who favors i t , can 
make the d iscret ionary judgment entrusted t o 
him by the State and can thus obey the oath 
he takes as a juror ." 391 U.S. at 519, 88 
S.Ct. at 1775. 
Persons who cannot vote for the 
imposit ion of cap i ta l punishment in any 
circumstances and persons who f e e l compelled 
t o vote for the imposit ion of cap i ta l 
punishment in a l l circumstances of murder are 
properly excluded for cause. The proper t e s t 
of l ega l p a r t i a l i t y i s whether a juror 1 s 
views about cap i ta l punishment would prevent 
or s u b s t a n t i a l l y impair him or her from 
consc ient ious ly taking the j u r o r ' s oath and 
performing h i s or her dut ie s as a juror by 
fol lowing the c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on the law 
of capi ta l punishment and applying them to 
the f a c t s of the part icular case . £ f . Adams 
v, Texas. 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 
2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). 
675 P.2d at 589. However, in t h i s case when the individual voir 
dire of each of the challenged jurors i s reviewed, i t becomes 
c lear that none had impressions so strong that he or she f e l t 
compelled t o vote for the death penalty in a l l circumstances of 
f i r s t - d e g r e e murder, or would ignore the c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on 
the law of cap i ta l punishment and not decide defendant's case 
with the necessary degree of impar t ia l i ty . 
- 3 6 -
While Shumway s tated that he bel ieved in capita l 
punishment for premeditated murder, he a l so said that he would 
not impose death in a case where the aggravating circumstances 
did not outweigh the mit igat ing circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt (R. 1634) . S imi lar ly , Johnson thought the death penalty 
should e x i s t , she explained that i t was not appropriate in 
cer ta in cases depending upon the f a c t s and that she would 
consider the fac tors as the court instructed her (R. 1524) . 
Ms. Lundberg a l s o expressed that the death penalty should apply 
in some cases (R. 1421), but agreed that i f ins tructed that the 
aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mit igat ing 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and she found that they 
did not, she would fol low the law (R. 1422-23) . Contrary to 
defendant's a s s e r t i o n , none of these people expressed an "eye for 
an eye , tooth for a tooth" doctrine although one other potent ia l 
juror who did was not excused by the judge.3 Defendant did not 
challenge that individual for cause at the time nor argue on 
appeal that he should have been excused. 
The exchanges between the court and the three 
ind iv iduals challenged on appeal indicate the i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
accord the defendant impart ia l i ty and t o fol low the c o u r t ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , in s p i t e of the ir b e l i e f s in favor of the death 
penalty . The court did not err , therefore , in f a i l i n g t o excuse 
3 Stanley Williams quoted the Bible as h i s reference for h i s 
b e l i e f in "a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye ." He 
continued, "so-somebody takes somebody e l s e ' s l i f e , then they 
should pay for i t . " (R. 1183) . He a l so sa id , however, that he 
would not vote for death in every case of f i r s t degree murder. 
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these persons for cause, e s p e c i a l l y when they were not challenged 
by defendant. 
Defendant next a l l e g e s that the court " fa i l ed t o 
adequately expla in the standard to be applied in the penalty 
phase" ( A p p e l l a n t s Brief at 47) t o four potent ia l jurors . 
Although he does not d e t a i l what was wrong with the judge 's 
explanation or what should have been done to remedy t h i s a l l eged 
error, he apparently claims i t was error. He did not, however, 
object t o the method of quest ioning of these ind iv iduals on these 
grounds nor ask the judge to c l a r i f y the explanat ions even though 
the judge accorded him wide l a t i t u d e in taking an a c t i v e ro le in 
the jury voir d i r e , and allowed him to ask quest ions of h i s own 
whenever he indicated a des i re to do so. For these reasons, t h i s 
claim lacks substance and does not merit review. 
F i n a l l y , defendant contends that two persons who were 
excused because they expressed concerns about the death penalty 
should not have been excused. Jean E. Pauli tz not only expressed 
that she had "never been too in favor of the death penalty" 
(R. 1148) but when to ld that the other a l t e r n a t i v e was l i f e 
imprisonment sa id , "I fd say l i f e in prison." (R. 1149) . 
Then when asked by defense counsel whether she thought she could 
fol low the jury i n s t r u c t i o n s on the law she said she was not sure 
(R. 1150) . Ms. Pauli tz was excused and defendant did not object 
(R. 1150) . 
Max Baldwin a l s o expressed concerns about the death 
penalty saying: 
A I don't never l i k e to see anything 
happen or death penalty t o anybody, as far as 
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that goes . If i t ' s j u s t i f i e d , maybe I could. 
I don't know whether I could or not. But at 
the present time I don't f ee l that , I don't 
know whether I could j u s t i f y the death 
penalty or not. 
(R. 1565) . Then the fol lowing exchange occurred: 
Q All r ight . Let me put i t t h i s way, s i r : 
If I to ld you that the bad circumstances of 
t h i s crime had t o outweigh the not so bad 
circumstances of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and i f you found that those 
bad circumstnaces did outweigh the others 
beyond a reasonable doubt, would you impose 
the death penalty? 
A I t ' s a hard quest ion t o answer. I would 
have to say that right now I don't knew 
whether I can or not. 
Q Okay. If I to ld you that , or put i t 
another way, i f you found in your own mind 
that the good circumstances, the l e s s 
of fens ive circumstances of the crime, 
outweighed the — s tr ike that . If you found 
in your own mind that the good outweighed the 
bad, then I take i t you would not impose the 
death penalty. Right? 
A Well, that i s r i g h t . 
Q. But, on the other hand, i f the bad 
outweighed the good, you don't know whether 
you would or whether your wouldn't . I s that 
right? 
A I don't know if I could or not. I ' l l 
put i t that way. 
Q I s ee . All r ight . 
(R. 1565-66). It is apparent that Mr. Baldwin simply was not 
going to give a more definitive answer than that which he had 
already given three times. In this instance, the judge was 
correct in exercising his discretion and in his advantaged 
position deciding that this individual could not be relied upon 
to act impartially and follow the law as instructed. This Court 
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has held that i t was error not to exclude jurors who could not 
d e f i n i t e l y say they would fol low the law and act impart ia l ly . 
State V, MoOie, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977); State v. Hewitt, 680 
P.2d 22 , 25-26 (Utah 1984) . Defendant's argument that the 
opposite i s the standard—the the juror must d e f i n i t e l y say he or 
she w i l l not fol low the law before the court can excuse them—is 
f r i v o l o u s . 
This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y recognized that the 
quest ion of degree of p a r t i a l i t y "remains l arge ly within the 
d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court ," and that "based on the j u r o r ' s 
expressed f e e l i n g s , a t t i t u d e s , and opinions f the t r i a l court roust 
determine by a process of l o g i c and reason, based upon common 
experience , whether the juror can stand in an a t t i t u d e of 
indi f ference between the s t a t e and the accused." Lacey, 665 P.2d 
at 1312, s i t i n s State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878. £&& &LSQ Jenkins, 
627 P.2d at 536 ("Due considerat ion should be given to the t r i a l 
judge's somewhat advantaged p o s i t i o n in determining which persons 
would be f a i r and impartial j u r o r s . " ) ; Ris ta ino v. Ross. 424 U.S. 
589, 594-95 (1975) ("Voir d ire i s conducted under the supervis ion 
of the court , and a great deal must, of n e c e s s i t y , be l e f t to i t s 
sound d i s c r e t i o n . This i s so because the 'determination of im-
p a r t i a l i t y , in which demeanor plays such an important part, i s 
par t i cu lar ly wi th in the province of the t r i a l judge . 1 " ( c i t a -
t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ) . Given the deference accorded the t r i a l court , 
and because the record suggests that Paul i tz and Baldwin might 
not act impart ia l ly and that t h e i r views would "substant ia l ly 
impair Ithem] from consc ient ious ly taking the j u r o r ' s oath and 
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performing I their] du t i e s as • . • juror Is) by following the 
cour t ' s in s t ruc t ions on the lav of capi ta l punishment and 
applying them to the f a c t s of the part icular case ," Norton, 675 
P.2d at 589; j&££ AlSfl Wainwriqht v. Wit t , U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 
844 (1985); S ta te v. Rogers, 17 Ohio St .3d 174 f 478 N.E.2d 984, 
990 (1985), the court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in excusing 
them for cause. Hewitt. 689 P.2d a t 26. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
EXCUSE FOR CAUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
WHO ADMITTED THEY HAD FORMED OPINIONS 
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT BECAUSE THESE 
INDIVIDUALS INDICATED ALSO THAT THEY 
WOULD ACT FAIRLY AND IMPARTIALLY. 
Defendant next contends that fourteen of the jury 
p a n e l i s t s should have been excused for cause because they had 
formed opinions about defendant's g u i l t which they expressed 
during individual voir d ire quest ioning . He claims that he 
challenged these fourteen potent ia l jurors for cause on t h i s 
b a s i s . Of the fourteen ind iv idua l s named by defendantr only s i x 
were challenged for cause. They were: Bernardean Marie Packer 
(R. 1079) , Brian C. Groo (R. 1279) , Richard Roy Eubank (R. 1349) , 
Janet N. Taylor (R. 1402), Richard Barry Westwood (R. 1582), and 
Annetta G. Wilkey (R. 1618) . The other e ight ind iv idua l s named 
in Appel lant ' s Brief a t 50-52 were not challenged for cause by 
defendant. They are: Cec i l e L. Gal lent ine , Jack Lavarr 
Donaldson, J r . , Susan G. Heath, Bruce Rulon Tuckett, Heidi 
Nie l sen Strong, IIa C. Lundberg, Craig Ray Watkins, and Patrick 
W. Shumway. Because defendant did not chal lenge these e ight 
potent ia l jurors for cause, he cannot be heard for the f i r s t time 
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on appeal to claim that they should have been excused. See 
People v- King. 83 Cal.Rptr. 402, 463 P.2d 753, 762 (Cal. 1970); 
State v , Reid. 698 P.2d 588, 591 (Wash. App. 1985); State v. 
Burton, 681 P.2d 646, 655 (Kan. 1984) . 
As for the s ix ind iv idua l s that defendant did challenge 
for cause, a l l of them indicated that they would se t as ide the ir 
opinions and decide the case based on the f a c t s presented at 
t r i a l as contemplated by Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14) which 
provides, in part: 
lN)o person sha l l be d i s q u a l i f i e d as a juror 
by reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public 
rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notor i e ty , i f i t s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
appears t o the court that the juror can and 
w i l l , notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impart ia l ly and f a i r l y upon the matter to 
be submitted t o him. 
What defendant f a i l s t o recognize i s that a challenge for cause 
may be granted only i f the po tent ia l juror "has formed or 
expressed an unqualif ied opinion or be l i e f as t o whether the 
defendant i s g u i l t y or not gu i l t y of the offense charged." I d . 
(emphasis added). None of the challenged persons held an 
"unqualified" or i r r e v e r s i b l e opinion; rather, the ir opinions 
f e l l into the category of " l ight impressions which may f a i r l y be 
supposed t o y i e l d to the testimony that may be o f fered ." 4 iLta££ 
v, Ba i l ey . 605 p.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); £££ alSQ Utah R. Crim. 
4 ii££ voir d ire of each challenged person: Ms. Packer (R. 1071, 
1082-83); Mr. Groo (R. 1269-71, 1276-77); Mr. Eubank (R. 1340-42, 
1348-49); Ms. Taylor (R. 1395-97, 1400-01); Mr. Westwood (R. 
1577-79) ; and Ms. Wilkey (R. 1612, 1613-14, 1617-18) . 
P. 1 8 ( e ) ( 1 3 ) . Alsor even though defendant challenged Ms. Wilkey 
for cause on t h i s b a s i s , Wilkey said that she had not formed an 
opinion on defendant's g u i l t or innocence. i&£ R. 1612, 1615. 
Even the e ight po tent ia l jurors not challenged were 
q u a l i f i e d t o s i t as jurors . All responded that they could 
disregard any previous opinions and accord defendant the 
presumption of innocence.5 Also, Ms. Strong and Mr. Shumway, who 
are among the group of unchallenged jurors defendant complains of 
an appeal, both expressed that they had DL£L1 formed opinions about 
defendant's g u i l t or innocence. 
Aside from those mentioned in h i s br ief , defendant 
challenged for cause four po tent ia l jurors because they had 
expressed opinions about h i s g u i l t . They were: Stanley 
Will iams, Edward E. Backus, Stephen M. Snelson, and Peter Levi 
Reynolds. J£££ R. 1282-83. Judge Bullock denied these chal lenges 
based on Rule 18(e) (14) s ta t ing that he had seen no indicat ion 
that the court should d i s b e l i e v e any of them when they indicated 
a w i l l i n g n e s s to s e t as ide any prior opinions and decide the case 
on the mer i t s . The vo ir dire quest ioning of each of these 
persons bears out the correctness of Judge Bul lock's dec i s ion .6 
In f a c t , a l l of these four persons indicated they had not formed 
5
 jjfifi voir d ire of potent ia l jurors: Ms. Gallentine (R. 1112, 
1116-17); Mr. Donaldson (R. 1173, 1175); Ms. Heath (R. 1226-27, 
1231-32); Mr. Tuckett (R. 1325-27, 1332-33); Ms. Strong (R. 
1378); Ms. Lundberg (R. 1417-18); Mr. Watkins (R. 1493-94); and 
Mr. Shumway (R. 1632-33) . 
* 5J&£ voir d ire a t : (R. 1137-39, Edward Backus); (R. 1179-80, 
Stanley Wil l iams); (R. 1252-53, Peter Reynolds); (R. 1260-61 
Stephen Sne l son) . 
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opinions about defendant's g u i l t or innocence.7 
Clearly , the t r i a l court made proper r u l i n g s , in i t s 
sound d i s c r e t i o n , on a l l of defendant's chal lenges and would have 
been j u s t i f i e d in denying chal lenges to the e ight unchallenged 
p a n e l i s t s . I t i s wi thin the judge 's d i s c r e t i o n t o determine the 
degree of p a r t i a l i t y of po tent ia l jurors "based on . . . 
expressed f e e l i n g s , a t t i t u d e s , and opinions" of the juror 
"determine Id] by a process of l o g i c and reason, based upon common 
exper ience ." State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983) 
£ i t i n s State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981) . Because 
demeanor plays such an important r o l e , "a great deal must, of 
n e c e s s i t y , be l e f t to [the c o u r t ' s ] sound d i s c r e t i o n . " Ris ta ino 
v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1975) . For these reasons, Judge 
Bu l lock ' s ru l ings on t h i s i s sue should be affirmed. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ALLOWED SUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE 
OF THE JURY PANEL ON THEIR KNOWLEDGE 
OF DAN LAFFERTY'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant, re ly ing on State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 677 
(Utah 1983), contends that the prospect ive jurors were not 
questioned about t h e i r knowledge of Dan L a f f e r t y ' s t r i a l and 
conv ic t ion . Absent these ques t ions , he claims that he could not 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y exerc i se h i s peremptory cha l l enges . This argument 
i s not supported by the record. 
Many of the p a n e l i s t s were, in f a c t , questioned about 
the ir knowledge of Dan L a f f e r t y ' s t r i a l . &&& e-g- R. 1231-32, 
7
 id. 
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q u e s t i o n i n g of Ju ro r Heath; R. 1252-53 ques t ion ing of P a n e l i s t 
Reynolds; R. 1260-61, q u e s t i o n i n g of Ju ro r Snelson; R. 1269-70 
q u e s t i o n i n g of P a n e l i s t Groo; R. 1290 ques t ion ing of P a n e l i s t 
Oberndorfer (excused on t h i s b a s i s ) ; and R. 1293-95 q u e s t i o n i n g 
of P a n e l i s t Rober t s (excused on t h i s b a s i s ) . These a r e j u s t a 
few of the p a n e l i s t s who were ques t ioned about Dan L a f f e r t y ' s 
t r i a l . 
Moreover, Judge Bullock was very l e n i e n t with 
defendant , a l lowing him t o i n t e r j e c t q u e s t i o n s of h i s own many 
t imes throughout t h e e n t i r e v o i r d i r e p r o c e s s . When defendant 
ob jec ted a t one po in t t h a t Judge Bullock had not asked about 
Dan's t r i a l , t he Judge sa id he thought he had been asking but 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would ask t he q u e s t i o n (R. 1257-58) . 
T h e r e a f t e r , t he judge did ask about t h i s i s s u e . If defendant 
f e l t the q u e s t i o n i n g was inadequa te , i n l i g h t of Judge B u l l o c k ' s 
l en iency in a l lowing defendant t o ask a d d i t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s , 
defendant cannot complain if he f a i l e d t o d i r e c t the J u d g e ' s 
a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s m a t t e r . Or f a i l e d t o reques t t h a t those who 
had not been asked the q u e s t i o n s be r e c a l l e d . 
POINT IX 
DEATH QUALIFICATION OF A JURY IN A 
CAPITAL CASE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Since defendant f i l e d h i s b r i e f in t h i s c a s e , t h e 
United S t a t e s Supreme Court i s sued i t s op in ion in Lnckhart v . 
HcCJLfifi, U.S. , 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3085 (May 5 , 
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1986) , reaffirming i t s p o s i t i o n that death q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of a 
jury in a cap i ta l case i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The i s s u e s considered 
by the Court were ident i ca l to those raised by defendant. Those 
are: whether death q u a l i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s in a conviction-prone 
jury which denies a defendant an impartial jury f and whether i t 
a l s o r e s u l t s in a jury which does not comport with the f a i r -
c r o s s - s e c t i o n requirement of the Sixth Amendment. 
On the i s sue of the f a i r - c r o s s - s e c t i o n the Court sa id: 
We do not be l i eve that the f a i r - c r o s s - s e c t i o n 
requirement can, or should, be applied as 
broadly as [the Eighth Circu i t ] court 
attempted to apply i t . We have never invoked 
the f a i r c r o s s - s e c t i o n pr inc ip l e to 
inva l ida te the use of e i ther for cause or 
peremptory chal lenges t o prosect ive jurors , 
or to require p e t i t j u r i e s , as opposed to 
jury panels or v e n i r e s , to r e f l e c t the 
composition of the community at l a r g e . • . • 
But even i f we were w i l l i n g to extend the 
fa i r c r o s s - s e c t i o n requirement to p e t i t 
j u r i e s , we would s t i l l reject the Eighth 
C i r c u i t ' s conclusion that "death 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n " v i o l a t e s that requirement. 
The essence of a " fa i r -cross sect ion" claim 
i s the systematic exc lus ion of "a 
' d i s t i n c t i v e ' group in the community." 
FDuran v. Missouri^ 439 U.S. 357, 364 
(1979) . ] In our view, groups defined s o l e l y 
in terms of shared a t t i t u d e s that would 
prevent or s u b s t a n t i a l l y impair members of 
the group from performing one of the ir dut ie s 
as jurors , such as the "Witherspoon 
excludables" at i ssue here, are not 
8 Death qual i fy ing a jury involves removal for cause of those 
veniremen whose views on cap i ta l punishment would prevent or 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y impair the performance of h i s dut i e s in accordance 
with h i s oath and the c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on the law of cap i ta l 
punishment. £££ Wainwright v. Wittr U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 
844 (1985); Witherspoon v. I l l i n o i s , 391 U.S. 510 (1968); £ ia±£ 
v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985) . Under Utah law, 
veniremen who would always vote for the death penalty upon a 
convic t ion of f i r s t degree murder are a l so excludable , s t a t e v. 
HomjD, 675 P.2d at 589. 
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• d i s t i n c t i v e groups" for f a i r c r o s s - s e c t i o n 
purposes. 
McCree. 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 3088. The Court a l s o rejected 
the impart ia l i ty argument saying: 
We have c o n s i s t e n t l y rejected t h i s view of 
jury impart ia l i ty , including as recent ly as 
l a s t Term when we squarely held that an 
impartial jury c o n s i s t s of nothing more than 
"jurors who w i l l consc ient ious ly apply the 
law and find the f a c t s . " Wainwright v. Witt , 
469 U.S. , (1985) (emphasis added) 
. . . The view of jury impart ia l i ty urged 
upon us . . . i s both i l l o g i c a l and 
hopeless ly impractical . . . i f i t were true 
that the Const i tut ion required a certa in mix 
of individual viewpoints on the jury, then 
t r i a l judges would be required t o undertake 
the Sisyphean task of "balancing" j u r i e s , 
making sure that each contains the proper 
number of Democrats and Republicans, young 
persons, whi te -co l lar execut ives and blue-
c o l l a r laborers , and so on. Adopting [ th i s ] 
concept of jury impart ia l i ty would a l s o 
l i k e l y require the e l iminat io in of preemptory 
cha l lenges , which are commonly used by both 
the State and the defendant to attempt to 
produce a jury favorable to the chal lenger . 
i d . at 3089. Clearly , defendant i s not e n t i t l e d to revesal of h i s 
convict ion on the grounds that h i s jury was death-qual i f i ed . ij££ 
ALaQf State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) . 
POINT X 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
COMMITTED IN THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENTS 
IN THE TRIAL OR PENALTY PHASE. 
Defendant correc t ly notes that "prosecutors have 
considerable l a t i t u d e in the ir arguments to the jury" which 
includes the r ight "to d i scuss the evidence from the ir own 
standpoint" and to draw inferences ar i s ing from that evidence. 
Appel lant ' s Brief at 55-56. ££fi State Vt Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 
(Utah 1973). He also correctly points out that "Islcrupulous care 
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roust be exerc ised by the State in capi ta l cases in both the g u i l t -
determining and penalty phases in presentat ion of evidence and 
argument because of the acknowledged uniqueness of the death 
penalty .* State v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261
 r 271 (Utah 1980) . The 
prosecutor 's arguments that defendant complains of in t h i s case f 
however, did not go beyond the permitted scope of argument even 
for a capi ta l case . 
F i r s t , however, defendant did not lodge a 
contemporaneous object ion t o any of the a l l eged ly offending 
comments (R. 1672, 2481, 2905) . When improper argument occurs at 
t r i a l , "t t lhe proper course i s to object t o the improper argument 
and request a c l a r i f y i n g i n s t r u c t i o n i f necessary." State v. 
JSmilb, 675 P.2d 521, 526-27 (Utah 1983) . This Court has 
e s tab l i shed a s t r i c t waiver rule for those s i t u a t i o n s where an 
object ion i s not made t o the a l l eged ly improper argument, even 
when a defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected r ight s such as the 
right not t o t e s t i f y i s involved. In State v. Hales f 652 P.2d 
1290 (Utah 1982) , where that r ight was involved, the Court held: 
The prosecutor's statements in the 
ins tant case came per i lous ly c lose t o , i f 
they do not exceed, the l i m i t s of permiss ible 
comment under t h i s standard. However, we are 
precluded from reaching the i s sue of the ir 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y by defendant's f a i l u r e to 
object to them at t r i a l . 
652 P.2d at 1292. This rule i s equally appl icable in cap i ta l 
c a s e s . £fifi £^8Ur Burris v. S t a t e , I n d . , 465 N.E.2d 171, 187 
(1984); Mincey v. S t a t e , 251 Ga. 255, 267, 304 S.E.2d 882, 892 
(1983); People v. Murtishaw, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 751 , 631 P.2d 
446, 459 (1981) , ££XJt. denied , U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 1280 
(1982); Palmes v. Wainwrightr 725 F.2d 1511, 1525 (llth cir. 1984) 
( in habeas corpus contex t ) • 
Because defendant f a i l e d t o object a t t r i a l to the 
prosecutor's comments he now chal lenges on appeal, t h i s Court i s 
precluded from addressing the i s s u e . Defendant's motions for a 
mis tr ia l based upon the prosecutor 's opening statement (R. 1714-
15) and upon the prosecutor's c los ing statement in the penalty 
phase (R. 2936-37) which was made after the jury had re t i r ed for 
de l ibera t ions in the penalty phase, were a l so i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
preserve the i s s u e s for review. HalfiJSr 652 P.2d a t 1292; .£££ a l so 
Basset t v. S t a t e . 449 So.2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) . Even i f the 
Court decides to address t h i s i s s u e , the prosecutor's comments do 
not warrant reversa l . Defendant f i r s t claims the prosecutor 
p r e j u d i c i a l l y mischaracterized a so -ca l l ed "revelation" from a 
higher authority d irec t ing an acquaintance of defendant to 
"remove" four persons as a " h i t - l i s t " was not based on evidence 
and was misconduct (R. 2480-81) (s&& R. 190 5-06 for t ex t of 
"reve lat ion") . On the contrary, however, t h i s character izat ion 
was cons i s tent with the S t a t e ' s theory of the case and with the 
evidence. 
The State postulated that the "revelat ion" was not a 
reve la t ion at a l l but was a l i s t of persons against whom defendant 
sought revenge for what he saw as meddling in h i s marriage and 
a s s i s t i n g h i s wife in obtaining independence and a divorce . 
Several wi tnesses recounted conversat ions with defendant where 
defendant to ld them he thought these persons were responsible for 
ending h i s marriage. Two of defendant's brothers, including 
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Brenda L a f f e r t y ' s husband, t e s t i f i e d that there was d i s sent ion 
among the members of "The School of the Prophets" about the 
v a l i d i t y and advisedness of the "revelation" when defendant and 
Dan Lafferty attempted to present i t as a r e v e l a t i o n . They said 
that the method of i t s rece ipt by defendant did not conform with 
the method by which other acceptable "revelat ions" had been 
received by other members of the group. 
From t h i s evidence f the jury could draw the conclusion 
that the wri t ing was in fact a l i s t of persons against whom 
defendant sought revenge by murder committed by a th ird-party; 
i . e . a " h i t - l i s t " as that term i s commonly used. All that the 
prosecutor sought to do was to point out to the jury that such a 
conclusion was reasonable. He said that no one t e s t i f i e d in those 
words that e x h i b i t 44 (&&& R. 1905-1906 for t ex t ) was a h i t - l i s t 
but that he characterized i t that way. He to ld the jury to draw 
their own conclusion as t o what that wri t ing ac tua l ly was. Thus, 
the prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider matters they would 
not be j u s t i f i e d in considering in reaching a v e r d i c t . SJEZ s t a t e 
v. Andreason, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 , 24 (1986) . 
Next, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly 
t e s t i f i e d t o the jury when he said during the opening statement 
that the defendant "stood over [Brenda] and he grabbed her ha ir , 
and he pul led her head back so that the blood from her heart would 
pump f r e e l y to the kitchen f l oor ." (R. 1672). Defendant says that 
there was no evidence t o t h i s e f f e c t in the record. While i t i s 
true that no eye wi tness t e s t i f i e d in t h i s case that they saw 
defendant a c t u a l l y pul l the v i c t i m ' s head back, the p o s i t i o n of 
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her body in the photograph (Exhibit 18) and the testimony of the 
medical examiner support such an inference. Dr. Ryser said tha t 
Brenda*s body was s t i l l a l ive when her throat was cut and tha t the 
amount of blood on the floor indicated her heart was s t i l l pumping 
(R. 1975-76)• Also, Knapp & Carnes both t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant 
said he had k i l l ed Brenda by holding her by the chin and cut t ing 
her throat (R. 1767-68, 2119,-21)• From t h i s evidence the jury 
could conclude that defendant pulled Brenda1s head back to allow 
her blood to flow onto the f loor , although perhaps by her chin 
rather than her ha i r . These remarks, therefore , did not ca l l the 
j u r y ' s a t t en t ion to matters they were not j u s t i f i e d in 
considering. JLd. The jury was ce r t a in ly j u s t i f i e d in considering 
the method in which the murder occurred in deciding whether 
defendant had committed f i r s t degree murder. 
Last ly , defendant c i t e s the prosecutor ' s closing 
argument of the penalty phase and contends tha t the prosecutor 
improperly s ta ted to the jury his opinion tha t defendant would 
k i l l again if given the opportunity. The jury , however, may 
properly consider a defendant 's future propensity toward violence 
when deciding whether the death penalty i s appropriate in the 
individual case. I t i s the j u r y ' s function to determine the 
appropriateness of the death penalty based upon the individual 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the cr iminal . Andrews v. Shulsen. 600 F. Supp. 
408, 423 (D. Utah C D . 1984). 
There was evidence presented in the penalty phase tha t 
defendant acted-out v io len t ly while in j a i l . The evidence a t 
t r i a l revealed t ha t two of his t a rge t victims from the 
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•reve lat ion" were s t i l l a l i v e . From t h i s evidence, the prosecutor 
could argue and the jury could consider that defendant would try 
t o k i l l again i f given the opportunity. The jury could properly 
consider t h i s evidence in determining whether the death penalty 
was appropriate in t h i s case . 
Because a l l of the statements complained of were things 
that the jury could properly consider, there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct in t h i s case . Defendant was, therefore , not prejudiced 
by the prosecutor 's arguments and reversal of h i s convic t ions 
would be inappropriate. 
POINT XI 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE 
TRIAL COURT ADMITTED PHOTOGRAPHS 
OF THE VICTIMS' BODIES INTO EVIDENCE. 
Defendant contends that the t r i a l court abused i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n when i t admitted i n t o evidence two photographs of h i s 
v i c t ims ' bodies—Exhibit 18 (color photo of Brenda Lafferty as she 
lay when discovered by the p o l i c e ) , Exhibit 20 (black and white 
photo of Erica Lafferty l a i d down in cr ib showing neck wound). 
He argues that the photographs were cumulative of other evidence 
and the danger of prejudice r e s u l t i n g from the admission of those 
photographs far outweighed any probative value they had and 
therefore his convictions should be reversed. 
It i s well se t t led that Mtlhe tr ia l court's ruling on 
the admissibil i ty of evidence wi l l not be reversed absent a 
showing that the tr ia l court so abused i t s discretion as to create 
a l ikelihood that injust ice resulted." s tate v. Royballf 710 P.2d 
168, 169 (Utah 1985), .citing State V. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 944 
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(Utah 1982)* With respect t o the admission of photographs l i k e 
those at i s s u e here, t h i s Court in s t a t e v. narc ia . 663 P*2d 60 
(Utah 1983) , s e t forth the fol lowing ru le : 
We have frequently s tated and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim—even photographs that are 
gruesome—are not inadmissible i f they are 
probative of e s s e n t i a l f a c t s , even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
663 P.2d at 63. The Court added that "the key considerat ion in 
the appl icat ion of t h i s rule has been the relevance of the 
photographs," Xd. F ina l ly , i t s tated that the relevance of the 
proposed photographs roust be weighed against the risk of creat ing 
undue prejudice: 
[T]he court should determine whether the 
viewing of the photographs by the jury would 
create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice against the defendant, and if so, 
whether that danger substantially outweighs 
the photographs1 essential evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the 
greater the need to establish its essential 
evidentiary value, Commonwealth v. 
Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. at 381, 317 A.2d at 
226, and, conversely, the more essential the 
evidentiary value of the photograph, the 
greater the defendants burden to require its 
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory 
nature would be prejudicial to him. The 
point of the reference to "essential 
evidentiary value" in the context of 
potentially prejudicial photographs of the 
victim1s body is that such photographs would 
generally be inappropriate where the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put 
before the jury readily and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potential 
prejudice. 
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original). Having articulated these 
rules, the Garcia Court went on to hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting four photographs which 
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showed d i f f erent angles of a homicide v ic t im bloodied by stab 
wounds. It concluded that those photographs, ad though gruesome, 
were not overly prejudic ia l and were relevant t o show the area 
where a wi tness saw the defendant drop the body, to show the 
nature of the v i c t i m ' s wounds and thus the defendant's s t a t e of 
mind, and to corroborate an expert w i t n e s s ' s testimony that there 
was not enough blood on the ground for the stabbing t o have 
occurred where the body was found. Id* 
At t r i a l , the prosecutor in the instant case argued 
that the picture of Brenda was probative because i t depicted the 
condit ion of the body and the pos i t i on in which i t l a i d on the 
f loor in r e l a t i o n to other evidence of the s trugg le . He a l s o 
noted that i t was i l l u s t r a t i v e of the po l ice o f f i c e r ' s and crime 
lab technic ians testimony (R. 18, 1931-32) . As for the photo-
graph of Erica, the prosecutor argued that t h i s photograph showed 
the manner in which the knife wound was in f l i c t ed—one smooth 
motion as opposed t o a sawing motion and that t h i s was 
corroborative of the medical examiner's testimony (R. 1934) . 
The t r i a l court in i t s rul ing s ta ted that the photos were a l so 
relevant to the degree of the crime (R. 1939) . 
Unfortunately, the prosecutor never asserted at t r i a l 
that the photographs were of e s s e n t i a l evident iary value , as t h i s 
Court has s t res sed he must do where the photographs sought to be 
admitted are gruesome. £jg£ State v. Cloud, P.2d , Case 
No. 19884 (May 2 3 , 1986) . Although t h i s Court has not defined 
what i s meant by "gruesome," and no one argued at t r i a l that 
these photographs are gruesome, most people would probably agree 
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that they are gruesome. The point at which photographs cross 
over the l i n e in to gruesoineness i s d i f f i c u l t to perceive and even 
more d i f f i c u l t to a r t i c u l a t e . The prosecutor did s t r e s s the 
probativeness of the photographs. As s tated in Garcia and noted 
above, the fact that the evidence was cumulative of other 
testimony should not render the photographs inadmiss ible . 
The t r i a l court ruled that the photos showed the degree 
of the crime and they are cer ta in ly probative of i n t e n t . This 
was not a case , such as £JLQLLd# where the defendant conceded any 
of the f a c t s in controversy but, in f a c t , he i n s i s t e d on h i s 
innocence.9 Moreover, i t i s important that the prosecutor did 
not unduly s t r e s s the photographs for any prejudic ia l purpose 
before the jury as t h i s Court found occurred in £l£lld. 
The photographs in t h i s case are cer ta in ly graphic, i f 
not gruesome. However, compared with those that have previously 
been found p r e j u d i c i a l , they f a l l short of those admitted in 
State v. Poe. 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968) , where the 
t r i a l court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in admitting color s l i d e s , "one 
of which depicted the deceased's head, showing the base of the 
skul l after the skul l cap and brain had been removed by the 
patho log i s t and the skin peeled over the edge of the skul l 
showing the empty brain c a v i t y , and the other of which showed a 
top view of the empty c a v i t y . " State v. Wells , 603 P.2d 810, 813 
(Utah 1979) . 
9 Defendant's opening statement was reserved unt i l the time for 
presenting his case , after the c lo se of the S t a t e ' s case . Even 
so , no concess ions on g u i l t were made in that statement. 
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Furthermore, the photos were not completely devoid of 
evident iary value . Because the prosecution has the burden of 
proving a l l the elements of the crime, relevant photographs 
should be admissible even though other evidence may a l so 
e s t a b l i s h the f a c t s . Jur ies are not required t o be l i eve even 
expert testimony offered in support of the S t a t e ' s theory on 
cause or method of death. Also, photographs serve an important 
function of i l l u s t r a t i n g and c l a r i f y i n g testimony and are 
relevant and admissible for t h i s purpose. JS&£ State v. Ross, 28 
Utah 2d 279, 284, 501 P.2d 632, 635 (1972); State v. Lawson, 585 
S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. 1979); S ta te v. Gi lbert , 671 P.2d 646, 647 
(N.M. 1983) . F ina l ly , criminal defendants often incorrec t ly 
assume that a jury i s unable to view unpleasant e x h i b i t s , which 
accurately depict the crime, without l o s i n g a l l perspect ive . As 
s tated in State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46 , 475 P.2d 543 (1970): 
There i s some sort of paradox involved where 
one commits a heinous act and then complains 
that the very s ight of what he has done i s so 
revo l t ing to the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of normal 
people (the jurors) that i t would so d i s t o r t 
t h e i r judgment that they could not f a i r l y 
determine his g u i l t or innocence of crime. 
The prosecution was duty-bound t o prove a l l 
of the elements of the crime by whatever 
evidence was a v a i l a b l e . This included the 
photographs. 
25 Utah 2d a t 50, 475 P.2d at 546. £&& Alfifl People v. Long, 38 
Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 5 3 0 , , 536-37 (1974) (observing 
that the e f f e c t of unpleasant or gruesome photos on the jury i s 
of ten exaggerated) . Defendant requests t h i s Court to s a n i t i z e 
h i s t r i a l for incredibly v i o l e n t crimes. As Chief J u s t i c e Hall 
noted in h is d i s sent ing opinion in clouds 
• 5 6 -
All evidence tends to prejudice the jury, and 
photographs are no exception. The fact that 
the photographs depict a gruesome scene 
created by defendant is no reason to exlude 
them from evidence if they are otherwise 
admissible* 
Slip op. at 9. 
If t h i s Court finds tha t the photographs in t h i s case 
were both gruesome and nonessent ia l , the Court should also find 
tha t they were harmless. The medical examiners1 testimony in 
t h i s case was very graphic and painted a p ic tu re in the minds of 
the jury of a scene much more gruesome than the photographs 
ac tua l ly depic t . While the vict ims1 heads were very nearly 
severed from the i r bodies, t h i s fact i s not obvious from the 
photographs. There i s a large amount of blood on the floor 
around Brenda Laf fe r ty ' s body but i t i s not the coagulated mass 
depicted in the photographs exhibited to the jury in Cloud. 
That the baby's photograph i s black and white reduces i t s 
gruesome ef fec t . 
They are not autopsy photos showing in te rna l 
explorat ions of wounds but depict the bodies as they appeared a t 
the scene. From the photographs, one cannot ascer ta in tha t Erica 
aspirated blood or tha t the vacuum cleaner cord around Brenda1s 
neck caused c a p i l l a r i e s over her eyes and neck to rupture . One 
cannot see tha t the knife cut in to the bony port ions of both 
victim*s spines . These things can be derived only from the 
medical testimony. These things are much more graphic in effect 
than the photographs themselves. For these reasons, admitting 
the photographs was a t most harmless e r ro r . 
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In sum, the t r i a l court , in i t s d i s c r e t i o n , could have 
reasonably concluded that the probative value of the photographs 
defendant chal lenges was not "substant ia l ly outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice ." Utah R. Evid. 403 (Supp. 1985)• 
Because defendant has not shown that the c o u r t ' s rul ing was an 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n so severe that i t resu l ted in a l i k e l i h o o d of 
i n j u s t i c e , he i s not e n t i t l e d t o a reversal of h i s conv ic t ion . 
S tate v. Knowlesf 709 P.2d 311 , 312 (Utah 1985) (upholding the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing that evidence should not be excluded under 
Rule 403) . Moreover, even i f the court did err in admitting the 
challenged photographs, the error was harmless. There simply i s 
no reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that without the error there would have 
been a r e s u l t more favorable to defendant. J i£ l l s , 603 P.2d at 
813; State V, Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) . hSLQSLd 
State V. Purce l l , 711 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1985) , s i t i n g Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a ) . 
POINT XII 
THE VIDEO RECORDING OF THE CRIME SCENE 
WAS PROEPRLY ADMITTED AT THE PENALTY 
PHASE. 
The State produced a very short v ideo recording of the 
crime scene a t the penalty phase. Although the recording may 
have been intended o r i g i n a l l y to appear in co lor , the majority of 
i t i s black and white . Portions of the recording that o r i g i n -
a l l y depicted the baby were edi ted out of the tape. All that 
remained were views of the wall behind the front door, two views 
of Brenda Lafferty ly ing on the f loor in the kitchen j u s t as she 
was found, views of the kitchen area and two views of the baby 
ly ing in her cr ib , just as she was found. Defendant argues that 
t h i s videotape was unduly prejudic ia l because i t was cumulative 
and intended t o inflame the jury. 
Prior t o the penalty phase, the prosecutor showed the 
videotape t o the judge and defendant for the purpose of obtaining 
an advance rul ing on i t s admiss ib i l ty (R. 2527-31) . He argued 
that the videotape was probative of the aggravating circumstance 
that : 
The homicide was committed in an e s p e c i a l l y 
heinous, a troc ious , cruel or except iona l ly 
depraved manner, any of which must be 
demonstrated by physical tor ture , ser ious 
physical abuse, or serious bodily injury 
of the v ict im before death. 
(R. 2530, 2538) . The t r i a l court admitted the videotape over 
defendant's object ions (R. 2530-31) . 
A review of the videotape revea ls that i t was not the 
prejudic ia l factor defendant claims i t was. The tape i s l e s s 
than f i v e minutes long. Most of i t i s in black and white . 
Although the color comes through occas ional ly during the view of 
the bloodstained wall and the view of Brenda's body, the views of 
Erica are completely black and white . The view of Brenda i s 
iden t i ca l to the photograph admitted at g u i l t phase. Erica i s in 
a p o s i t i o n where the wound t o her neck cannot be seen. She i s 
l y ing somewhat on her s ide , facing away from the camera. Her arm 
hides her neck and not even her face can be seen. There are 
smudges of blood on her body but, again, they are in black and 
whi te . 
While the videotape shows evidence that i s cumulative, 
there i s no requirement that the evidence at penalty phase not be 
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cumulative. The S ta te , as argued above, i s not required to put 
on any evidence at penalty phase but cer ta in ly may do so . To 
convince a jury that the weight of the evidence on aggravating 
circumstances i s , beyond a reasonable doubt, more than that of 
mi t igat ing circumstances, the State w i l l in most cases wish to 
present evidence at penalty phase. And, often times that 
evidence w i l l be the same or s imilar to the evidence adduced at 
the g u i l t phase. The use of the evidence by the jury, however, 
i s d i f f e r e n t . The jury at penalty phase uses the evidence of 
aggravation in a balancing process apart from the recogni t ion 
that the aggravation e x i s t s beyond a reasonable doubt which i s 
the gui l t -phase use of the evidence. So, in the sense that the 
jury uses the evidence for an e n t i r e l y d i f f erent determination— 
whether the death penalty i s appropriate—it i s not cumulative. 
Defendant's real complaint here i s the prosecutor 's 
c los ing argument where he s ta t ed : 
Make no mistake about i t . I intend t o ask 
you for the death penalty here today. And 
a l so make no mistake about i t , I do not do so 
l i g h t l y , without thought, without 
cons iderat ion . 
I knew when I was a t the crime scene in 
American Fork, I knew i t when I was in Reno 
ta lk ing t o the o f f i c e r s involved in the 
arres t there , I knew i t when we went t o 
Cheyenne, Wyoming and Detect ive Caldwell and 
I part ic ipated in the interviews of Carnes 
and Knapp, I knew when I was in American Fork 
that holiday weekend, that we were deal ing 
with a depraved mind. I knew that we were 
deal ing with somebody that was obviously 
crazy. You'd have to be crazy, I sa id t o 
myself, to do something l i k e t h i s . When we 
looked a t the baby in the c r i b , l a i d back, as 
you've seen her p ic ture , and baby Er ica ' s 
throat was s lashed open, we said t o 
ourse lve s , I said t o myself: Who could have 
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poss ib ly , poss ibly done something l i k e t h i s : They 
had to be crazy. Sure, he ' s crazy. When we look-
ed a t Brenda. And, you look at that p ic ture , and 
you see how her hair i s pulled back. And you saw 
a vacuum cleaner cord t i e d around her throat , none 
l i k e you saw. We saw red blood, fresh blood, and 
the smell of death. And t h a t ' s why, quite 
frankly, I t r i e d to show you that video tape; so 
that you could get a l i t t l e b i t , a l i t t l e b i t , an 
inkl ing of a f e e l i n g of what the smell of death i s 
ac tual ly l i k e . And I said t o myself: He or they 
have got to be crazy to be doing something l i k e 
t h i s . 
(R. 2884-85) . Defendant urges that t h i s argument points out that the 
only use of the videotape was t o inflame the jury. He does not go so 
far , however, as t o claim that the reference to the smell of death was 
prosecutorial misconduct. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , defendant did not object to 
t h i s argument at the time i t was made. Thus, he i s precluded from 
ra is ing i t as revers ib l e error on appeal. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 
521, 526-27 (Utah 1983) . Even i f he did make such a claim, whether 
t h i s argument was misconduct i s unrelated t o the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the 
videotape so long as i t had some admissible purpose. I t s purpose was 
to depict the aggravating circumstances of the crime and the 
appropriateness of the death penalty in a more succinct way than any 
testimony ever could. Nothing i s more relevant to the appropriateness 
of the death penalty than an exact reproduction of what the defendant 
did t o the v i c t i m s . 
This Court previously approved the use of a videotape 
recording of the crime scene at penalty phase in S ta te v. Brown, 6 07 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) . In l i g h t of the wide-ranging evidence that 
should be allowed in the penalty phase, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976)j the court*s admission of the videotape in t h i s case was not 
error. Defendant i s not e n t i t l e d on t h i s b a s i s t o reversal of h i s 
death sentences . 
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POINT XIII 
UTAH'S BIFURCATED CAPITAL SENTENCING 
SCHEME DOES NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO DEFENDANT TO SHOW THAT 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGHED 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE 
PENALTY PHASE. 
Defendant contends that Utah's capi ta l sentencing 
procedure s h i f t s the burden of proof to the defendant a t the 
penalty phase because the State has already proven aggravating 
circumstances e x i s t beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument was 
previously rejected by t h i s Court in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 
812, 815 (Utah 1980). The Court said5 
Contrary to P i e r r e ' s content ion, the burden 
of proof i s not sh i f ted . . . The defendant 
i s simply afforded the opportunity of 
presenting any evidence he may have in 
m i t i g a t i o n . The most that can be said . . • 
i s that the defendant then has the "burden" 
of going forward, but only if he so d e s i r e s . 
The burden of jyiQjQf remains a t a l l times 
on the prosecution. 
Id* (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . What defendant f a i l s t o see i s that 
jus t because the s t a t e has proved one or more aggravating 
circumstances e x i s t beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
necessar i ly mean that those f a c t o r s w i l l weigh more heavi ly on a 
j u r o r ' s mind than other fac tors in the weighing process . A juror 
may consider the mit igat ing f a c t o r s offered by a defendant to be 
more overwhelming than the fact that the crime was committed 
under one of the e ight s tatutory aggravating circumstances 
defined in the f i r s t degree murder s t a t u t e ; and there i s 
abso lu te ly no requirement that the defendant prove h i s f a c t o r s 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Defendant's claim that the burden of proving that the 
death penalty should not be imposed devolves on the defendant 
confuses the two d i s t i n c t meanings of "burden of proof." In i t s 
s t r i c t sense , the term denotes the duty of e s t a b l i s h i n g the truth 
of a given proposit ion by such a quantum of evidence as the law 
demands in the case in which the i s sue a r i s e s , whether c i v i l or 
criminal . Hi l l Y.*_Smithr 260 U.S. 592 (1923) . In a secondary 
sense the term "burden of proof" i s used to designate the duty of 
proceeding with evidence at a part icular stage in a court 
proceeding, e .y .r WcLiluy .v* £ fil c e,. 75 11 1 , App. 2d 44]
 r 220 
N.E.2d 761 (1966) . See a l so IX wigmore, Evidence § 2487 (3d ed. 
1940). In the instant case , a l ega l duty i s not imposed upon 
pet i t i o n e i: t o | > i: o d u c e e v i d e n c e o f m 11 i g a 11 n g c i r c u m s t a i i c e s, b i I t. 
rather a pract ica l neces s i ty of going forward i s imposed by s e l f -
i n t e r e s t . When the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
the ex i s t ence of at 1 east one statutoi:y aggi:avating ci i:cumstance 
during the g u i l t phase of a capi ta l murder t r i a l , a pract ica l 
necess i ty of going forward with at l e a s t some mit igat ing evidence 
may very well be placed upon the defendant during the sentencing 
proceeding by the defendant's own s e l f - i n t e r e s t to save h i s l i f e , 
but such i s not a l ega l burden placed upon him by s ta tu te and the 
burden of persuasion that the death penalty i s appropriate 
remains always with the S ta te , P ierre f 607 P.2d at 815. 
While1" the Stat c lias pi eviousl^ pi oved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the ex is tence of a s tatutory aggravating 
circumstance as a prerequis i te t o a f inding of g u i l t and as a 
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bifurcated proceeding, the aggravating circumstance during the 
sentencing phase i s simply one factor among many to be weighed 
when determining whether or not t h i s i s an appropriate case for 
the imposit ion of the death penalty. While t h i s factor may weigh 
heavi ly in the minds of the jury or judge, i t i s neither 
s t a t u t o r i l y nor necessar i ly given more weight than other f a c t o r s 
in aggravation or mi t iga t ion . The State must s t i l l assemble 
enough aggravating circumstances, the t o t a l i t y of which outweigh 
the mi t igat ing circumstances before the death penalty may be 
imposed. The defendant may introduce in to evidence anything of 
probative force , and in addit ion t o the s ix s tatutory mit igat ing 
f a c t o r s , "any other f a c t in mi t igat ion of the penalty ." Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-3-207(2) (g ) (Supp. 1985) . Addit ional ly , i f the 
defendant chooses t o have the sentencing proceeding before a 
jury, as he did, the S ta te need only f a i l to convince one juror 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mit igat ing 
circumstances, and l i f e imprisonment rather than the death 
penalty i s imposed, s ince the jury ' s dec i s ion on penalty must be 
unanimous. Thus, no burden whatsoever i s placed on the 
defendant. 
Defendant would have cause t o complain i f the State did 
not have to prove a l l elements of f i r s t degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Yet once the State has proved a l l the 
necessary elements, p e t i t i o n e r attempts to complain that by 
meeting i t s burden the State improperly makes mi t iga t ion harder 
to show. P e t i t i o n e r ' s real problem i s that Utah's f i r s t degree 
murder s t a t u t e i s s tr ingent on the S t a t e . I t requires proof 
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beyond a reasonable doubt of at l e a s t one aggravating 
circumstance in the g u i l t phase, thus narrowing the c l a s s of 
persons t h a t can b* c o n v i c t e d of f i r s i - d e g i tje rourrior Snnie 
aggravation must be proved in order to ob t a in a simple 
conv ic t ion , not jus t in order to obtain the death penalty* 
Other courts have upheld simil ar sen tenc ing schemes 
under t h i s same attack. Defendant in Adams v» Wainwright, 709 
F.2d 1443 (11th c i r . 1983), was convicted of felony murder and 
sentencecS to death. He claimed that under F lo r ida law the death 
penalty became the "automatically preferred sentence" because 
murder dur i i ig commission of a felony was a l s o a statutory 
aggravating circumstance to be considered at the penalty phase. 
In re j ec t ing Adams1 argument, the court declared: 
The shor t answer i s t h a t the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld the Florida death 
penalty s t a t u t e , including the case of t h i s 
s tatutory aggravating fac tor . Prof i t t v. 
F lor ida . 428 U.S. 242 . , , Florida does not 
mandate the death penalty in a l l felony 
murder case s . The defendant i s not pre-
cluded under Florida law from presenting 
any mit igat ing f a c t o r s . 
Adams, 709 F.2d at 1447, £&i±. denifidr 104 S.Ct. 745. Florida 
requires that the sentencing body f i r s t timid t lit e x i s t e n c e of at 
l e a s t one aggravating circumstance then secondly determine 
whether the aggravating circumstance outweighs any mit igat ing 
circumstances Arango v. S t a t e , 4,1 1 So. 2d 1 ? 2 IF1 a. I 981) I pe r 
curiam). £fi£ a l s o State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982) 
(per curiam) (threshold requirement that one aggravating 
circumstance e x i s t before jury can impose death penal ty does not 
imply automatic death penalty even where jury found no mit igat ing 
factors) » 
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Other s t a t e s that have upheld s imi lar s t a t u t e s where an 
element determined at the g u i l t phase i s then weighed as an 
aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase are: State v . 
£U3ULDr 293 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 1982) (element of felony murder a l s o 
included as aggravating f a c t o r ) ; S tate v. Perry. 420 So.2d 139 
(La. 1982) (f inding of an armed robbery at g u i l t phase does not 
impermissibly s h i f t burden to defendant when aggravated robbery 
a l so served as aggravating circumstance) , ££££• denied, 103 S.Ct. 
2438 (1983) . 
Because the burden was not sh i f ted to defendant t o show 
that the death penalty was inappropriate in h i s case , nor does 
the s t a t u t e create such a problem, defendant's death penalty was 
appropriately imposed by a jury who found that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mit igat ing circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt. His death sentence should, therefore , be 
affirmed. 
POINT XIV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
FROM THE PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE ON 
THE SENTENCE RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT'S 
ACCOMPLICE IN A PREVIOUS TRIAL. 
Defendant i n s i s t s that he should have been allowed to 
present the testimony of the county clerk that h i s accomplice, 
Dan Lafferty , received two l i f e sentences for these murders. 
He reasons tha t , because the ru les of evidence do not apply in 
the sentencing phase, t h i s evidence was admiss ib le . He a l s o 
urges that the evidence of what penalty h i s accomplice received 
was re levant to what sentence was appropriate for him under Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1985) . This evidence was, 
- 6 6 -
howeverf i n a p p r o p r i a t e and 11 relevant and was pro^Mly excluded 
by the t r i a l judge . 
The primary concern in a c a p i t a l case i s tha t the 
d e c i s i o n t o impose the death pei ial t> "was fai rl"/ made in the 
context of the c i rcumstances of I t he defendant] and [h i s ] 
crimes • hii d i EM s si* MM: r l s , 677 P.2d 8 1 , 93 (Utah 1983) . 
Defendant ' s argument t h a t t he ju ry should ha1 re beer i allowed t o 
cons ider h i s b r o t h e r ' s sen tence i s noth ing more than one for 
approval of the tj pe of case -by-case comparison r e j e c t e d by t h i s 
Court in Andrews v. Mor r i s , 60? I .2d 816, 82S (Utah 3 98- 3) , ££T±. 
i ten iad , 449 U.S. 891 , and again in Andrews V. Morr i s , 677 P.2d a t 
97-98. The only d i f f e r e n c e here I s t h a t defendant a sks the ju ry 
t o engage in case -by-case comparison i n s t e a d of the j u d i c i a r y . 
There i s no compelling reason t o allow the ju ry t o engage in the 
s o r t of comparat ive review t h i s Court has r e j ec t ed as 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e for i t s e l f . 
Defendant does not a s s e r t t h a t such review i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated, and l i g h t l y so. It: i s well s e t t l e d 
t h a t case -by-case p r o p o r t i o n a l i t i y review is not r equ i r ed by t h e 
Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , pu l l ey y, Harris# ....__.„. U.S. , 104 
S.Ct . 871 (1984) . Given t h e holding of die U u Andrews .Vi 
Morr is , cases f comparative p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review i s not r equ i r ed 
under the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n e i t h e r . Consequently f i t was not an 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n for the judge t o exclude the evidence of 
Dan 's l i f e sen tences from the j u r y ' s pena l ty d e l i b e r a t i o n s * 
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POINT XV 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE 
COURT IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE IN THE 
PENALTY PHASE RELEVANT TO THE 
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1985) provides, in 
part: 
In these sentencing proceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any 
matter the court deems relevant to 
sentence, including but not l imi ted to 
the nature and circumstances of the 
crime, the defendant's character. 
background, h i s tory , mental and physical 
condi t ion , and any other f a c t s in 
aggravation or mi t igat ion of the 
penalty . Any evidence the court deems 
t o have probative force may be received 
regardless of i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y under 
the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
The s t a t e ' s attorney and the defendant 
sha l l be permitted to present argument 
for or against sentence of death. 
(emphasis added). Under t h i s s t a t u t e , the State could present 
evidence of d e f e n d a n t s v i o l e n t character. The evidence 
presented by Lt. Scott that defendant acted out v i o l e n t l y in the 
j a i l was not inadmissible as defendant appears to claim. I t was 
relevant t o the sentence in the sense that i t showed that 
defendant would continue to commit crimes if the death penalty 
was not imposed. One of the fac tors that the sentencer may 
consider i s defendant's p o s s i b i l i t i e s for r e h a b i l i t a t i o n — o r — h i s 
propensity to continue h i s criminal a c t i v i t i e s ; h i s future 
dangerousness. Andrews v. Shulsen f 600 F.Supp. 408, 423 (D. Utah 
C D . 1984) . 
Defendant a l l e g e s that the S t a t e ' s evidence was l imi ted 
t o the two aggravating circumstances of the crimes that were 
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s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerated by the court. However, defendant 
overlooks that the jury was a l s o to ld to consider a l l of the 
evidence admit led J n iiic case in df jteimininij whether the 
aggravating fac tors s u f f i c i e n t l y outweighed the mit igat ing 
fac tors (R. 2539) . They were a l so instructed that they must be 
•persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the impos i t ion of the 
death penalty i s j u s t i f i e d and appropriate in the circumstances*" 
(R. 652) . 
Because the jury could properly consider d e f e n d a n t s 
v i o l e n t nature and because they were to ld to consider a l l of the 
evidence, the testimony Scott was properly admitted at the 
penalty phase. This i s true even though the jury was not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y to ld that i t was proper to consider character 
ev idence because 11 ie;; - wei:e t o l d to coi isi der a] 1 of the evidence . 
Defendant c i t e s State Y» Bartholomewr 654 P.2d 1170 
(Wash. 1982) as support for h i s contention that the jury should 
not have been a 1J cm eiJ t c» <:<>n& i cie r t h i *1 e v idenct . Bartholomew i s 
dis t ingui shable from t h i s case . 
The Bartholomew court correct ly observed that Gregg v. 
G e o r g i a , 4 ,> H i I, S. 1 "i I , ,' 11 \ • I) 4 11 9 7 b ) pe nn 11 «. w i d e - i an q l n q 
argument and disapproves unnecessary r e s t r i c t i o n s on the evidence 
that can offered in a capi ta l penalty hearing so long as the 
defendant . ••.,-. p re jud iced , That court went on to say that 
because the Supreme Court has never s p e c i f i c a l l y used t h i s 
standard to uphold aggravating evidence f while noting that 
neither has the high court struck down a case on t h i s b a s i s , the 
Washington Court reasoned that the pr inc ip le must be l imi ted t o 
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evidence in mi t iga t ion . 654 P.2d a t 1183. This reasoning i s 
unfathomable and i s not binding upon t h i s Court. 
Furthermore, the death penalty s t a t u t e in Washington 
only requires that the jury f ind that one aggravating factor 
e x i s t s t o j u s t i f y imposing the death penalty . 654 P.2d at 1182. 
This i s very d i f f eren t from Utah's s tatutory scheme which case 
law has defined as requiring that the aggravating fac tors not 
only e x i s t but that they outweigh the mit igat ing fac tors beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Wood, 638 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981) . There 
i s very l i t t l e danger in Utah that a jury would a r b i t r a r i l y 
impose the death penalty based upon the ex is tence of other 
criminal a c t s not proven through convic t ion . 
Utah's federal d i s t r i c t court has taken a pos i t i on on 
the in terpre ta t ion of fiuesa that i s opposi te from that espoused 
in Bartholomew* in Andrews v» Shulsen* 600 F. Supp. at 423 the 
d i s t r i c t court approved use of future dangerousness by the State 
in i t s penalty phase evidence. .See £lJ50 Cal i fornia v. Ramos, 463 
U.S. 992 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) . 
F ina l l y , defendant contends that he did not have proper 
not ice that the State intended to present t h i s evidence and was, 
there fore , unprepared t o confront i t . Defendant did not , 
however, object to Lt. S c o t t ' s testimony on t h i s b a s i s . Absent a 
timely and s p e c i f i c objec t ion t h i s Court should not review t h i s 
a l l eged error. S tate v. Larocco. 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983) . 
This i s true even though t h i s i s a cap i ta l case because the error 
in t h i s case , i f any, was not manifest and p r e j u d i c i a l . These 
elements are required before the Court w i l l review error raised 
for t h e f i r s t t ime on appeal even in a c a p i t a l c a s e . S t a t e v, 
Hfitfldf 648 P.2d 71
 f 77 (Utah 1981) , S t a t e v. Norton. 675 P.2d 577, 
581 (Utah 19 63) . 
POINT XVI 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD FIND BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGHED THE MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE DEATH 
PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant p o i n t s out ci*a> he offered evidence of "many11 
f a c t o r s (s ix) i n m i t i g a t i o n a t the penal ty phase. Based upon 
these f a c t o r s , he c la ims t h a t r easonab le minds could not have 
found t h a t the aggrava t ing ci rcumstances outweighed the 
m i t i g a t i n g c i rcumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. On the 
c o n t r a r y , however, t he ju ry could a p p r o p r i a t e l y impose the death 
pena l ty in t h i s c a s e . . 
What defendant f a i l s t o note i s t h a t the ju ry i s f r ee 
t o a s c r i b e the weight i t deems a p p r o p r i a t e t o each f ac to r 
p resen ted in aggrava t ion oi m i t i g a t i o n . The jury could 
reasonably a s c r i b e more weight t o the agg rava t ing f a c t o r s 
p re sen ted even i f they were fewer in number than t h e m i t i g a t i n g 
f a c t o r s a s s e r t e d by defendant . 
In t h i s ca se , defendant p a r t i c i p a t e d in two 
p a r t i c u l a r l y heinous murders . The heads of the v i c t i m s were 
n e a r l y severed from t h e i r bod ie s . One vic t im wiis spvcie ly h^dien 
and s t r a n g l e d before she was k i l l e d and the o the r was an 
e igh teen- month- o,l d baby. There was evidence t h a t defendant 
committed the murders out of revenge r a t h e r than out of a 
paranoid b e l i e f t h a t God wanted d e f e n d a n t s " p e r s e c u t o r s " 
e l i m i n a t e d . 
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After the murders, defendant and h i s accomplices 
t r a v e l l e d t o another home intending to k i l l i t s occupant and was 
thwarted only by the fact that she was not a t home, A fourth 
target was inadvertent ly passed up as the men f led the second 
home. This, along with the evidence that defendant acted out 
v i o l e n t l y while in j a i l , was a sound b a s i s for the jury to 
conclude when considering the nature of the defendant, that he 
would k i l l again i f given the opportunity. 
All of these fac tors are cer ta in ly s u f f i c i e n t to 
outweigh the fac t that defendant had no prior criminal record and 
that he had been a good fr iend , neighbor and community servant in 
the past . Moreover, the jury was not required even*to be l i eve 
that defendant acted under the substant ia l domination of Dan when 
he murdered these innocent people because a l l of the evidence 
pointed t o the r e a l i t y that i t was defendant who d i s l i k e d these 
people and wanted revenge. Nor was the jury required to be l i eve 
that defendant was mentally i l l , e i ther at the time of the 
offense or a t t r i a l . In f a c t , there was evidence that defendant 
was not mentally i l l that the jury could, and probably did, 
b e l i e v e . 
Clear ly , from the nature of the crime and of the 
defendant, the death penalty was appropriate in t h i s case . The 
j u r y ' s dec i s i on t o impose death should, therefore , be affirmed. 
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POINT XVII 
THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE 
PENALTY PHASE DID NOT PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT AND DOES NOT WARRANT 
REVERSAL OF HIS DEATH SENTENCE. 
Defendant urges that the t r i a l court erred by admitting 
hearsay and double hearsay testimony in penalty phase of the 
t r i a l . He makes t i n s claim d e s p i t e tl - utory d i r e c t i v e t h a t 
probative evidence i s admissible in the penalty hearing regard-
l e s s of the exclusionary ru les of evidence, For support he 
points t o State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) wherein tl . is 
Court condemned the prosecutor's use of double hearsay evidence 
in that case , Defendant ' s ana lys i s of BXQKD'S impl icat ions in 
t h i s case , however, f a l l s short* 
The evidence offered by the State in Brown was not only 
double hearsay but i t was ai i i naccurate account of what had been 
said by the declarant (Brown). I t included the r e p e t i t i o n of 
what purported to be prec i se ly what Brown had said and repre-
sented thai defendant utr.p/l a vulvar e x p l e t i v e r e f e r r i n q t o the 
murder v i c t i m s . Moreover, the statement was offered even though 
the wi tness , a prosecutor, had been s p e c i f i c a l l y admonished not 
to r e l a t e such tes t imony, T1 ii s Coui: t £ ocu se d oi I the i n f 1 ammatory 
nature of the words themselves and t h e i r inaccuracy when i t 
reversed Brown's death sentence holding that t h i s error in 
conjunction with the fac t t h a t t he ju ry was i iot :i i M i t ruc ted tl ,at 
the State bore the burden of proof in the penalty phase could not 
be harmless e r r or 607 F'.2d at. 269-270. 
Defendant in t erpre t s Brown to say that hearsay and 
double hearsay are never admissible in a capi ta l penalty hearing. 
That was not what Brown held. Brown stands for the proposit ion 
that such evidence i s not admiss ible i f i t i s l e g a l l y prejudic ia l 
t o the defendant. 607 P.2d at 271 . Such was not the case here. 
In contrast to the testimony in hiSMH, the portion of 
Lt. S c o t t ' s testimony complained of by defendant contained no 
inflammatory language nor any purportedly d i r e c t quotes from 
defendant. Lt. Scott re lated that defendant's c e l l mate 
(Montgomery) complained to Scott about an a l leged assau l t upon 
Montgomery by defendant (R. 2568) . Scott t e s t i f i e d that * 
Montgomery sa id: 
That Mr. Lafferty was acted [ s i c ] ag i ta ted 
that morning, and so he [Montgomery] jus t 
t r i e d t o stay to himself, and he was 
watching t e l e v i s i o n . And he said that Ron 
asked him to change the channels because 
he d idn' t want to watch that part icular 
channel that day. And he was s i t t i n g there 
watching i t , and he didn't change i t , he said 
he continued t o watch i t because he enjoyed 
that program, and then suddenly Ron Lafferty 
attacked him and h i t him in the nose breaking 
h i s g l a s s e s and h i t t i n g him about the head. 
(R. 2569) . Scott said that he inves t iga ted Montgomery's 
complaint as part of h i s duty as Lt. Commander of the j a i l 
(R. 2568-69) . Scott observed that Montgomery's g l a s s e s were 
broken (R. 2568) . 
Defendant also complains about testimony by Scott about 
an incident involving defendant and Dan Lafferty. Scott observed 
defendant reaching through the bars of his cell into Dan's cell 
trying to grab Dan. Scott asked Dan about the incident and 
related the following at trial: 
And then he [Dan] proceeded to tell me that 
Ron had been trying to stab him [Dan] with 
a pencil, and was trying to grab him and 
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would k i l l him if he had the opportunity t o , 
and he [Dan] was r e a l l y scared of him and 
he was afraid that Ron would try to k i l l 
himself. 
(R. 2570) . None of the testimony of Scott rose to l e v e l of tl :iat 
disapf -•*. . SLLSMJI* In fact , none- of il purported to quote 
defendant d i r e c t l y nor was It inflammatory in nature. Because 
hearsay remains permissible in a penalty hearing, Brown, 607 P.2d 
a t 26 9; flu b t t AQdUMii V. SliulSUIlr 600 F ' .Supp . 40B, 4 / ? -iD, Utah 
C D . 1984) , the court did not e i i in admitting t h i s testimony 
that was not l e g a l l y prejudic ia l to defendant. £££. al£Q Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 2 03 -0 4 (1976). 
At worst, the evidence complained of by defendant was 
harmless error. It did not impute inaccurate , inflammatory 
statements t o defendant. Taken together with S c o t t ' s other 
testimony of a s s a u l t s committed by defendant that Scott 
personally observed, t h i s evidence did not stand out as 
part icu lar ly crucia l to the S t a t e 1 s p o s i t i o n . The evidence of 
aggravation was overwhelming even without the evidence complained 
of. Defendant docj«-» not quality f oi leyprsdl of his death penalty 
on t h i s b a s i s . Especial ly where the jury was properly instructed 
on the burden of proof and the S t a t e ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to carry 
that bi ;i rden, 
POINT XVIII 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THAT 
IT COULD CONSIDER EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
DURING THE GUILT PHASE WHEN DELIBERATING 
ON THE PENALTY. 
Defendant urcieb, without c i t a t i o n to author1 _ . that 
the jury should not have been instructed that they could consider 
g u i l t phase evidence when de l iberat ing during the penalty phase. 
He a s s e r t s that some of the evidence admitted in the g u i l t phase 
might have been inadmissible in the penalty phase and that there 
i s no way t h i s Court can determine whether the jurors r e l i e d upon 
such inadmissible evidence* This argument i s without merit . 
Recently, the United S ta te s Supreme Court sa id: 
i t seems obvious t o us that in most, i f not 
a l l , cap i ta l cases much of the evidence 
adduced at the g u i l t phase of the t r i a l 
w i l l a l s o have a bearing on the penalty 
phase; i f two d i f f erent j u r i e s were to be 
required, such testimony would have to be 
presented twice , once t o each jury. 
As the Arkansas Supreme Court has noted, 
"IsJuch r e p e t i t i v e t r i a l s could not be 
c o n s i s t e n t l y fa i r to the State and perhaps 
not even t o the accused." Rector (v. S t a t e , 
280 Ark. 385, 396, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 
(1983)
 f £SJiL. itenifLd, 466 U.S. 988 (1984)1. 
Lockhart v. McCree, U.S. , 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3085, 
3090 (May 5 , 1986) . And t h i s Court has acknowledged that the 
sentence pursuant to § 76-3-201 need not be based on evidence in 
addit ion t o that adduced at t r i a l . State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 , 
83, n. 9 (Utah 1982) . Sect ion 76-3-201(5) merely s t a t e s that the 
sentencing body jnay consider aggravating and mit igat ing evidence 
in addi t ion to t r i a l evidence, and c l e a r l y contemplates that the 
sentencer may at l e a s t consider the f a c t s in the t r i a l record in 
the penalty phase of a cap i ta l case . Consequently, the t r i a l 
court committed no error in so ins truc t ing the jury. 
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POINT XIX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO ARREST 
JUDGMENT. 
Defendant claims that the t r i a l court should have 
granted h i s motion to arres t judgment because ti ie coin: t had 
found, as a matter of law, that defendant was mentally i l l . 
Defendant misconceives the purpose of Rule . Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-23 (1982), and overlooks the c- ental 
i l l n e s s in Utah Code Ann, § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1985) . 
Ru3 e 23 provides i •:•••• 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon i t s own i n i t i a t i v e 
may, or upon motion of a defendant s h a l l , 
arres t judgment i f the f a c t s proved or 
admitted do not c o n s t i t u t e a public o f fense , 
or the defendant i s mentally i l l , or there i s 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arrest ing judgment the court may, unless 
a judgment of acqui t ta l of the offense 
charged i s entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment unt i l the defendant i s 
charged anew or r e t r i e d , or may enter any 
other order as may be jus t and proper under 
the circumstances. 
Utah Code Anr * 77-35-23 (1982) . The purpose of t h i s rule i s 
much the san- •it for a judgment notwithstanding the v e r d i c t . . 
From the text of t h i s rule one can conclude that 
prophlylact ic rule designed to protect against aberrant jury 
verd ic t s . In cases where the- evidence does not e s t a b l i s h the 
elements of the o f fense , or where the evidence shows that as a 
r e s u l t of mental i l l n e s s the defendant was unable to form the 
r e q u i s i t e i n t e n t , or the ciefei ic3ai it was incompetent to stand t r i a l , 
the judge has the power to override a jury ' s verdict of g u i l t y . 
In t; .his case , however, the evidence was not i n s u f f i c i e n t nor did 
it demonstrate a mental illness that prevented defendant from 
forming the requisite mental states for his crimes nor that 
defendant was incompetent to proceed. Defendant, consequently, 
was not entitled to an arrest of judgment. 
Defendant overlooks the definition of mental illness in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1985). This section states: 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute or ordinance that the defendant, 
as a result of mental illness, lacked the 
mental state required as an element of the 
offense charged. Mental illness shall not 
otherwise constitute a defense. 
. . . 
(3) Mental illness means a mental disease 
or defect. Mental defect may be a congenital 
condition or one the result of injury or a 
residual effect of a physical or mental 
disease. 
Defendant erroneously states that Utah Code Ann. S 64-7-28(1) 
(1953) contains the only definition of mental illness that appears 
in the Utah Code. However, when the appropriate criminal code 
section is read together with Rule 23, it is clear that an arrest 
of judgment is proper only where a defendant's mental illness 
precluded him from forming the requisite mental state(s) for the 
crime(s) he was convicted of. Since defendant did not raise the 
insanity defense and there was no evidence that he was incapable 
of forming the applicable mental states, the trial court did not 
err when it denied his motion. 
Defendant mistakenly treats Rule 23 as a rule 
permitting an override of a death penalty where a defendant is 
mentally ill. There is, however, a specific statute dealing with 
that issue. Utah Code Ann. S 77-19-13 (1982) provides: 
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(1) Iff a f t e r judgment of death, there i s 
good reason to be l i eve the defendant i s 
incompetent t o proceed as defined in t h i s 
t i t l e , . . • the warden shal l immediately 
give wri t ten notice to the court in which the 
judgment of death was rendered, to the 
prosecuting attorney and counsel for 
defendant and the judgment shal l be stayed 
pending further order of the c o u r t , 
(2) On rece ipt of the n o t i c e , the mental 
condit ion of the defenant sha l l be examined 
in accordance with the provis ions of chapter 
15 of t h i s t i t l e . . . , 
This rule would more r e a d i l y conf orm t o the p >urpose 
defendant apparently has in mind—i.e . to avoid the death penalty. 
A motion under t h i s s ec t ion may be made at an appropriate l a t e r 
time. (jSfifi jaLSQ R. 959, 988; wherein Judge Bui lock t r e a t s 
d e f e n d a n t s Rule 23 motion as seeking r e l i e f more appropriately 
sought under t h i s sect I o n ) . 
Because Rule 23 was designed as a prophylactic r u l e t o 
override jury v e r d i c t s in appropriate cases , and t h i s i s not one 
of those c a s e s , the 11 i al cou i: t cor r ect 1 y den i ed defendant f s 
motion for an arres t of judgment. 
POINT XX 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF 
BOTH THE INCHOATE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY AND 
A COMPLETED OFFENSE. 
Defendant was convicted of murdering Brenda and Eric 
L a f f e r t y and of c o n s p i r i n g t o IIUJICIM G h l o c Low and Hi c h a r d S t i v e . 
He a s s e r t s for the f i r s t time on appeal that he was wrongly 
convicted of both the inchoate crime of conspiracy and a completed 
o f f ense . j£££ Utah Code Ann. § 3 "6 • 4 • 3 02 (19 82) . His theory i s 
that there was only one conspiracy to k i l l a l1 four people and 
t h a t coin pi e t i o i i of tl: i e tv c in t 11: d€ : r s absol ved him of c r im ina 1 
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respons ib l i ty for conspiring t o k i l l the other two people. 
This argument lacks b a s i s in the evidence. 
Defendant's theory i s based apparently on the fact that 
defendant received only one "revelation" naming a l l four people. 
Thus, he claims there was only one conspiracy. This view of the 
evidence overlooks that the conspiracy s t a t u t e requires a union of 
a plan, and an agreement with one or more persons with the intent 
to carry out the plan. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1978). 
At the time the reve la t ion was received/ there may have been a 
plan and poss ib ly even intent to carry i t out but the element of 
conspiring with one or more persons was miss ing. 
Moreover, there was no evidence of defendant's in tent 
to carry out any part of the plan unt i l July 23 and 24 when 
defendant and h i s four accomplices began discuss ing s lashing 
throats and gathering weapons. At t h i s point in t ime, however, 
Carnes' and Knapp1s testimony ind ica te s that only Brenda and Erica 
were mentioned as intended v i c t i m s . Thus, at t h i s point , there 
was a conspiracy to k i l l Brenda and Erica. A crime of which 
defendant was neither charged or convicted. 
Unti l Carnes and Knapp t e s t i f i e d that the Lafferty 
brothers discussed going t o Chloe Low's home to k i l l her (R. 1742, 
2304-05) , there was no evidence of a conspiracy to k i l l her. This 
d icuss ion took place in the car af ter defendant and h i s brother 
k i l l e d Brenda and Erica. Thus, t h i s was a separate conspiracy 
evidenced by a plan t o k i l l her, agreement t o engage in k i l l i n g 
her and in tent to carry out the murder. Neither Carnes nor Knapp 
saw the s o - c a l l e d •reve la t ion" naming these v i c t i m s . 
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Not unt i l the four men f l ed Chloe Low's home was 
Richard St. owe e\ ei d i scussed . Carnes and Knapp t e s t i f i e d that 
then the Lafferty brothers discussed for the f i r s t time • their 
in tent to gc t o Stowe fs home and k i l l him (R. 1752, 2309-11) At 
th i s po i i it, tl: i e i ie ce s sa ry i in I oi i of a pi ai i, an ayi eement and intent 
were evidenced, not before. Consequently, t h i s a l so was a 
separate conspiracy of which defendant could be convicted. 
Defendant'"" s argument woul d be pe r suas ive had he been 
convicted of conspiring t o k i l l e i ther Brenda or Erica. This was 
not the c a s e . 
Even i f t he re was only one conspjrary to k i l l four 
persons, defendant could properly have been convicted of one count 
of consp i r acy . This i s so because the "completed" crime would 
have been murder of a l l four persons. Murder of only two of the 
four resul ted in an incomplete crime and, thus, convict ion of one 
count of coi ispiracy would not ha;1". e been convict ion of both a 
completed crime and an inchoate crime, Thereforer if t h i s Court ' 
accepts defendant's argument that there was only one conspiracy 
then lie i s e n t i i l e d to l eve i s a l ot only one of the two conspiracy 
conv ic t ions . 
Moreover, i t i s not l i k e l y that the Legis la ture 
intended in cases such at; t h i s one to absolve a defendant of 
cr iminal i ty where he i s successful in carrying out only a portion 
of h i s plan. I t i s the conspiracy i t s e l f that i s o f fens ive to 
soc i e ty where t he in tended act was not carri ed out • In f a c t , for 
t h i s reason, many s t a t e s and the federal government allow 
conv ic t ion of both conspiracy and a completed o f fense , ffee 
Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law. 687-88 (1982) • Utah's re tent ion 
of the common lav theory should not be used by a defendant such as 
t h i s one to avoid cr iminal i ty for the a c t s vhich he c l e a r l y 
conspired to do but vhich he vas unsuccessful in completing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests t h i s Court 
t o affirm defendant's convic t ions and t o affirm his death 
sentences . 
DATED t h i s day of June, 1986. 
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J. Robert Bullock, JUDGE 
In the afternoon of May 2, 1985, the Court declined to direct defendants 
counsel to pursue with Dr. Groesbeck and two other Utah State Hospital doctors 
their opinions relating to defendant9s mental state on July 24, 1985, as it 
pertains to the crime of manslaughter. The part of the manslaughter statute 
involved (76-5-205 UCA) ia: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: • . • 
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where 
the actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide 
a moral or legal justification or extenuation for his 
conduct although the conduct is not legally justifiable 
or excuseable under the existing circumstances. 
The ruling was made by the Court after extensive arguments by counsel and 
examination of Croeabeck and Interrogation of the defendant outside the presence 
of the jury. The Court stated that at an appropriate time reasons for its declina-
tion would be detailed upon the record. These are the reasons: 
1. Defendant requeated hla counael to cease the pursuit of any manslaughter 
defense. Upon Interrogation by the Court outside the presence of the jury de-
fendant stated in effect that he felt that If counsel argued for conviction of 
the crime of manslaughter it would be construed by the jury aa an admission by 
the defendant of the killings and an attempt by him to t9plea-bargaln9> for a 
leaaer crime, which he did mot "feel comfortable19 in doing. He said the same 
thing several tlmea in slightly different ways, and it was obvious to the Court 
that if the matter were further puraued by counsel at the direction of the Court 
•2-
Dver the objection of the defendant there vould likely have been an open schism 
before the Jury In the conduct of the plaintiff9a case. It vould have been 
difficult, at best, for the Court to deal vlth the Batter, and very likely vould 
have resulted in a deprivation of Faretta and other rights of the defendant. In 
the extreme It might have required the Court to remove th*defendant from the 
courtroom in order to proceed. 
There is no doubt In the Court1a mind that defendant was competent to make 
that decision. His reasoning was rational, though in Counsel's mind his judgment 
may have been poor. The Court has previously held the defendant to be competent 
to proceed under Section 77-15-2 UCA of the Utah Code, which findings were filed herein 
en April 8, 1985.After observing the defendant through three days of voir dire 
examination of prospective jurors and three-and-a-half days of trial, the Court 
saw nothing which in any way cast doubt upon the validity of those findings or 
conclusions. On the contrary, the conduct of the defendant to that time in the 
trial demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant at all times fully comprehended the nature of the proceedings, that he 
knew and understood the charges being made against him, and he fully understood 
the punishment which could be Imposed for those crimes. 
As part of the Court's continuing duty to monitor the competency of the 
defendant throughout the trial, the Court at the beginning of the voir dire ex-
amination requested Dan Price, Trial Court Administrator for the Fourth Judicial 
Diatrict, to continuously observe the defendant In the courtroom vlth respect to 
his ability to assist counsel in his defense. His affidavit is available to counsel 
and any reviewing Court. From the Court's own observation defendant's ability to 
assist counsel was unquestionably demonstrated throughout the trial. 
2. On the atate of the record at the time the Court's ruling was made, 
opinion evidence by Groesbeck as to the mental atate of the defendant at the time 
of the killings vould not have been admissible anyway under the manslaughter 
statute above quoted for the following reaaons: 
(a) The State's theory of the case was that defendant committed the murder 
of Brenda Lafferty and was going to commit murder of Chloe Low and Richard Stowe 
because defendant perceived them ae having meddled in hla domeatic affaire and 
•3-
lustd his wife, Dlanna, to divorce him. The tvidence fully supported theState's 
heory and there was little If any tvidence to the contrary. The State, not the 
rfendant, had Introduced the "revelation/' and had contended throughout that it 
ss simply a vehicle by which defendant sought to involve others in revengeful 
urders and furnish an excuse for their commission. There was no contrary 
vidence. 
(b) From the proceedings held outside the presence of the jury, it was 
lear that the defendant had consistently from the beginning maintained a generally 
on-cooperative stance with the doctors as to all events of July 24, 1984, the day 
pon which the murders were committed, and particularly defendant had not talked 
o any of the doctors about what took place in Brenda Laffertyfs home at the time 
>f the killings or what went on in defendant's mind at the time. 
(c) In order for Groesbeck or any other doctor to have been able to express 
my opinion as to whether or not defendant "reasonably believed" the circumstances 
>rovided a moral or legal justification or extenuation of his conduct, he would 
iave had to first make the assumption that defendant killed pursuant to the 
'revelation" commanding him to do so. This would have been very difficult if not 
Impossible to do for at least two reasons. 
First, the revelation (Exhibit 6) did not direct defendant to do the killings, 
but rather stated that a drifter by the name of "Todd" had been raised up and would 
be prepared by God to do so. Defendant was not Todd. 
Second, there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that defendant 
killed or thought he killed to carry out the terms of the revelation. On the 
contrary, Carnes had testified that on the morning of the murders they went to 
the home of Hark Lafferty to borrow a 20-gauge shotgun. Defendant stated to Mark 
that he wanted the gun to go hunting. Mark asked him what he was going hunting 
for, and Ron answered "any fucking thing which gets in my way." 
-according to Carnes, 
Similarly,'after the crimes were committed and the four were on their way to 
Vendovtr defendant was bragging about how he had beat Brenda and said over and 
over again "Look at the knot on my hand." He said "My god, I was hitting her so 
hard I put a knot on my hand, but I just couldn't knock her out." Then while 
banging the knife on his knee, he said "I killed the bitch, I can't believe it. 
You know the funny thing of it is thst instead of just taking care of one loose 
and, we took care of two." Within about five hours after the murders defendant 
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and his three accomplices were sating hot dogs, drinking beer, and gambling in 
Wendover. 
In this Court's judgment, in view of the above and in view of the evidence 
aa to how the crimes were committed, no one, including Croesbeck, could properly 
assume that defendant thought he was carrying out the will of Cod when he was 
beating and killing Brenda, and his brother was slashing the throat of Brenda9s 
baby. To have made auch assumption would have required ignoring the evidence 
and the Court would not have permitted it. 
3. Under the facts and circumstances of this case manslaughter is not a 
lesser Included offense of the first degree murders charged* Although the Court 
gave a manslaughter instruction, it now believes it was error to do so, albeit 
harmless error. In the Court's opinion, as a matter of lav, the manslaughter 
atatute does not accommodate a "reasonable" belief of any person that there is 
a moral or legal justification or extenuation for throat slashing style killings 
of human beings, as in tb*s case, based upon a "revelation" from God. 
Dated this /&> day of May, 1985. ^ ^ } 
J! ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
cc: Wayne B* Watson, Esq. 
Koall T. Vootton, Esq. 
Richard B. Johnson, Esq. 
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DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Defendant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The charges in this case were originally filed 
against four defendants, Ronald W. Lafferty, Dan Charles 
Lafferty, Charles (Chip) Carnes and Richard (Ricky) Knapp. 
In exchange for their testimony at trial, Knapp 
and Carnes pleaded guilty to reduced charges and are now 
serving sentences at the Utah State Prison. 
Due to incidents involving Ron and Dan Lafferty 
while they were incarcerated pending trial, questions arose 
Sis to their competency to proceed to trial. Several evalu-
ations were made at the jail, State Hospital, and hearings 
were held by the Court. These evaluations temporarily cul-
minated on November 27, 1984 with regard to Ron Lafferty 
when a report was issued by doctors from the Utah State 
Hospital stating that he was not mentally ill. More specifi-
cally, the report stated: 
MHia (Ron Lafferty's) mood, affect, and 
*Vt4i4f»v fn nprrpivp And interDret reality are 
Criminal No. 9303 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2-
each appropriate. Although he clearly has 
fundamentalist beliefs and a fervent interest 
in a strict interpretation of constitutional 
law, we feel that these do not approach the 
level of a thought disorder. He specifically 
does not meet the diagnostic criteria for 
"paranoia" or Mparanoid schizophrenia. Further, 
although he does have paranoid traits, these 
are associated with his religious beliefs and 
are not present to the threshhold which is 
required to meet the diagnostic criteria for 
(paranoid personalities disorder)." 
Based upon this report and the Court's obser-
vation of Ron Laffertyfs demeanor, his intellect, and his 
abilities to articulate at a subsequent hearing, Ron was 
found competent to proceed to trial. Trial for both Ron 
and Dan, who were to be tried together, was set for 
January 3, 1985. 
On December 29, 1984, Ron attempted suicide and 
was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital. 
Upon motion of the State, Dan and Ronfs cases 
were severed and Dan proceeded to trial on the scheduled 
date. Dan was found guilty on all counts including two 
capital homicides. Since the jury was unable to reach a 
unanimous agreement to impose the death penalty, he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment on the capital felonies 
and is presently serving his sentences at the Utah State 
Prison. 
Because of Ronfs suicide attempt, his competency 
to proceed to trial was again put in question. Pursuant 
to petition of the County Attorney to determine competency 
filed on January 2t 1985 the Court ordered him again com-
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On January 22, 1985, another report received by the Court 
from the doctors stated: 
"During this evaluation, we have seen signs 
of diffuse organic brain damage (of the dimentia 
type), which is consistent with his apparent 
attempted suicide by hanging, which occurred on 
December 29, 1984. This brain damage was clearly 
not present during our previous in-patient evalu-
ation. The organic brain damage we have seen is 
characterized by: confusion, decreased intellectu-
al functions, both short-term and long-term memory 
impairment, decreased psychomotor activity, disturb-
ed sleep, wakefulness pattern, decreased abstract 
thinking abilities, altered affect, and able to per-
form certain purposeful behavior. During this 
hospitalization, there has been gradual and progres-
sive improvement in each of these features." 
The doctors stated in effect, however, that the 
defendant was "incompetent to proceed" to trial but was 
improving and needed more time. 
On January 28, 1985, the Court held a competency 
hearing on the matter pursuant to Section 77-15-5(5) U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, at which the doctors who submitted the 
report and Ron testified. The doctors reaffirmed what was 
submitted in their report, and restated their conclusions 
that the defendant was not yet competent to stand trial. 
The defendant was observed to be well oriented as to time 
and place. He recognized the people present, was articulate 
and remembered specific events which had occurred, in relation 
to this matter, prior to his suicide attempt. He knew and 
understood what he was charged with. Although he could not 
state the specific counts in the Information, he knew and under 
stood he was charged with murder, burglary and conspiracy. 
He knew and understood he could be sent to prison for life or 
-* —
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crimes were and what his relationship to them was. He 
also stated that he could discuss matters with his counsel 
and that if he chose to he could discuss the events that 
transpired on July 24, 1984, the date of the crimes. 
Since the doctors and Ron all felt a few more 
weeks could make a big improvement in his physical and 
memory impairment condition, an order was made to accommo-
date those opinions, and the Court ordered a further 
hearing to be held on April 4, 1985. This hearing was 
actually held on April 2, 1985 inasmuch as the parties 
and the Hospital were ready. 
On March 19, 1985, another report was submitted 
to the Court by the doctors. That report contained the 
following information: 
"Since our January 22, 1985, report to the 
Court, the signs of diffuse organic brain syn-
drome which we have described have partially 
resolved and coincident with that, his person-
ality structure and his demeanor have come to 
approximate his condition prior to December 29, 
1984. 
"However, as he has become more lucid and 
expressive, the pervasive religiousity which 
was present during our evaluation in November 
1984 has developed into a religious delusional 
system which is associated with blurred ego 
boundaries. He is unable to determine the 
boundaries between himself and good and evil 
spirits and is unable to comprehend that those 
involved in this evaluation or the court pro-
cesses do not function within his delusional 
system. At this time we feel that these symptoms 
are the result of paranoia. Further symptoms 
of this disorder include a paranoid delusional 
system which has generalized to include the 
entire judicial system, a paranoid pseudo 
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and severely imparled ability to perceive 
and interpret reality. Although Mr. Laffertyfa 
memory has improved during this hospitalization, 
because of his unwillingness to honestly discuss 
this we cannot accurately determine to what extent 
his memory has returned. 
At the hearing on April 2, 1985, three of the 
four examiners who submitted the report gave oral testimony. 
Additionally, Dr. D. Eugene Thome, a clinical psychologist 
and a lawyer, was called by the State as a competency expert. 
The defendant was questioned but refused to answer most of 
the questions put to him, stating that he took the "Fifth." 
The answers which he did give were generally not inappro-
priate under the circumstances. 
Dr. Thorne did not agree with the conclusions of 
the other examiners to the effect that the defendant was not 
competent to proceed under Section 77-15-2 U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, and stated that he felt Ron was competent to pro-
ceed to trial. He stated that in his opinion Ron does ration-
ally understand the nature of the proceedings against him and 
he can rationally assist counsel should he want to do so. Dr. 
Thorne made the following statement: 
MA11 of us have various beliefs, which to 
some degree or another will help us chhose how 
we111 respond. The choice of behavior that comes 
from our beliefs may not reflect ability as much 
as belief. His belief that, for example, that there 
is a conspiracy in the judicial system and that the 
attorneys are in fact part of this conspiracy, does 
not detract from his ability to respond; but that's 
a conscious choice on the part of the defendant/1 
ISSUE 
The issue before the Court is whether or not the 
defendant is "incompetent to proceed" as that term is 
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defined in Section 77-15-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
which reads as follows: 
"Incompetent to Proceed Defined. For the 
purposes of this chapter, a person is incom-
petent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disease or defect resulting in either: 
"(1) In his inability to comprehend the 
nature of the proceedings against him or the 
punishment specified for the offense charged; 
or 
"(2) In his inability to assist counsel 
in his own defense." 
FINDINGS 
The Court has reviewed all reports, has fully 
considered the testimony of all of the witnesses and 
has received, noted and filed herein counsels' memoranda. 
In addition, the Court has made independent research of 
applicable law. Being fully advised the Court makes the 
following findings: 
1. Ronald W. Lafferty is probably suffering from 
a mental disease or defect, but such disease or defect does 
not result in either his inability to comprehend the nature 
of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified 
for the offense charged; or his inability to assist his 
counsel in his defense. 
2. He has the mental capacity to appreciate 
his presence in relation to time, place and things; his 
elementary mental processes are such that he knows and 
understands that he is in a court of justice and is charged 
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two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of 
conspiracy to commit murder; he knows and understands 
the penalties prescribed and he knows and understands 
that he could be given the death penalty although he 
may not believe it will occur, he understands that there 
will be a trial, that there will be a judge on the bench, 
a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of 
criminal charges; knows and understands that he has a 
lawyer appointed for him who will undertake to defend 
him against those charges; he knows he will be expected, 
if he so chooses, to tell his lawyer the circumstances, 
to the best of his ability, of the facts surrounding him 
at the time and place where the law violations are alleged 
to have occurred; he knows that there will be a jury 
present to pass upon the evidence adduced as to his guilt 
or innocence of such charges; that he has sufficient 
mamory of material events that with the aid of memory 
reconstruction techniques he can relate these things in 
his own personal manner if he chooses to do so. 
3. Although the defendant may be operating 
within a paranoid delusional system, there is no evidence, 
except a suicide attempt, of irrational behavior within 
that system or within the system of his religious beliefs. 
In fact, his refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or admit 
that he is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are 
all consistent with his paranoia and any delusional system 
pertaining to religion. 
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the Hospital examiners made findings in their report 
dated March 19, 1985, pertaining to matters of involun-
tary commitment. For the time being and until a further 
hearing in the matter, the Court accepts those findings 
as follows: 
(a) Mr. Lafferty at this time has a mental illness 
as defined in Utah Code Annotated 64-7-28(1) (However, 
such mental illness does not result either in his inability 
to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him 
or the punishment specified for the offenses charged; 
or in his inability to assist counsel in his defense.) 
(b) Because of Mr. Lafferty's mental illness he poses 
an immediate physical danger to himself and others which 
includes jeopardizing his own safety. 
(c) Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a 
rational decision making process regarding the acceptance 
of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of in-
ability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treat-
ment. 
(d) There is no appropriate treatment alternative at 
this time to treatment at the Utah State Hospital. 
(e) The Utah State Hospital can provide Mr. Lafferty 
with treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and 
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he knows he is charged with various offenses and could 
ultimately be put to death for two of those offenses. They 
also felt that If he wanted to he could give information 
to defense counsel. 
The report of March 19, 1985 indicated that the 
organic problems caused by the suicide attempt have become 
partially resolved and his personality structure and demeanor 
have come to approximate his condition prior to December 29t 
1984. Dr. Croesbeck testified that Ron's memory had improved 
since the suicide attempt, and all of the experts agreed 
that memory reconstruction techniques could further assist 
Ron in regaining his memory surrounding the events occur-
ring on July 24f 1984. 
An issue very similar to the one posed here was 
raised in Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 2264 (1983). 
In that case the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals had held the 
following: 
"Fulford had the capability to assist his 
attorney but simply refused to do so. But, if 
this refusal was based on his paranoid delusions, 
it cannot be successfully urged that Fulford was 
actually capable of assisting counsel." 
Although not alluding to that point specifically, 
the Supreme Court of the U.S. reversed the Court of Appeals. 
In the case of Weiter v. Settle, 193 Fed. Supp. 
318, (W.D. Mo. 1961) the court listed eight points to look 
at in determining the competency of a defendant: 
"1. That he has mental capacity to appreciate 
his presence in relation to time, place and things; 
"2. That his elementary mental processes 
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are such that he apprehends (i.e., seizes and 
grasps with the mind he has) that he is in a 
court of justice, charged with a criminal offense; 
"3. That there is a judge on the bench; 
"4. A prosecutor present who will try to 
convict him of a criminal charge; 
M5. That he has a lawyer (self-appointed or 
court-appointed) who will undertake to defend him 
against that charge. 
"6. That he will be expected to tell his 
lawyer the circumstances, to the best of his mental 
ability (whether colored or not by mental abber-
ation) the facts surrounding him at the time and 
place where the law violation is alleged to have 
been committed; 
"7. That there is, or will be, a jury present 
to pass upon evidence adduced as to his guilt or 
innocence of such charge; and 
"8. He has memory sufficient to relate those 
things in his own personal manner. 
The Court is not unmindful and is respectful of 
the conclusion reached by the hospital examiners in their 
written report of March 19, 1985 to the effect that in 
their opinion Ronald W. Lafferty is incompetent to pro-
ceed. It is with a great deal of reluctance and respect 
that I am compelled to factually disagree, and from a legal 
standpoint to hold otherwise. 
It is my opinion that the examiner's conclusions 
are based almost entirely upon the 1960 case of Dusky v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 402,(1960) and that they have 
misapplied the law enunciated by that case. Dusky is a 
very short per curiam opinion with no underlying facts 
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•tated therein, and it is not possible to ascertain from 
the opinion the context in which the words relied upon by 
the examiners were used. Subsequent cases, however, have 
delineated what the Dusky standard is, which have been set 
forth in the State's memorandum, including Welter v. Settle, 
•upra, and those cases do not mandate a finding of "in-
competency to proceed" with respect to defendant Ronald W. 
Lafferty. 
In conclusion, the Court notes that Section 
77-15-2, U.C.A., is a codification of the simple "under-
stand and assist91 standard of the common law, and that the 
common law is perhaps the least stringent of the tests of 
competency to stand trial which the various courts through-
out the country apply. In this Court's opinion the Utah 
Legislature has rightly opted to place the crucial questions 
of insanity, mental illness, and diminished mental capacity 
as they bear upon the question of guilt or innocence with 
the jury, and as they bear upon the question of punishment, 
with the Court. (77-35-21) 
Further, it is the opinion of the Court that in 
order to determine the threshhold inquiry of competency to 
proceed, so as to be able to get to the crucial question of 
mental capacity to commit a crime, and if convicted to deter-
mine appropriate punishment, the law does not contemplate 
a full acale mental examination or an exhaustive battery of 
psychological testing. In fact, upon the inquiry of a 
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defendant'a competency to proceed, under Section 77-15-5, 
the Court is not even required to have any psychiatric 
or psychological examination of him. The Court believes 
that a defendant who may have some mental illness or defect 
is not thereby "incompetent to proceed" within the meaning 
of the law unless he is so far out of it that to proceed 
would not comport with his rights to due process of law. 
It is the Court's finding that defendant's mental condition 
is not such that his due process rights would be in any way 
denied by proceeding to trial. The Court holds that the 
defendant is not "incompetent to proceed" under Section 
77-15-2f U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
Let an order is^# consistent with the foregoing. 
Dated this O day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
